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THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION": THE WRONG ANSWER 
TO THE CRISIS OF INADEQUATE H ALTH CARE FOR 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
In 1999, Regina McKnight, a homeless, mentally retarded woman 
who was pregnant and addicted to cocaine, was charged with murder 
when her child was stillborn. The South Carolina Supreme Court a$ 
firmed her murder conviction and upheld the twenty-year sentence im- 
posed. ' 
In 2002, a severely mentally disabled woman became pregnant after 
being raped by the owner of the group home where she lived. The wife of 
a Florida prosecutor sought to be appointed "guardian of the fetus" in 
order to prevent the woman @om taking prescription drugs necessary to 
maintain her physical health and mental stability and to prevent the 
woman @om having an abortion. Ultimately, the Florida courts rejected 
these efforts. 
In 2004, Melissa Rowland, apregnant woman with a long history of 
mental illness, sought assistance at a hospital because she noticed a de- 
crease in fetal movements. Doctors recommended a Caesarean delivery, 
but Rowland declined, and the hospital offered no other help. When one 
of the twins she was carrying was stillborn, Rowland was charged with 
murder, with prosecutors asserting that she had acted with depraved 
indlference to the value of human life.3 
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1. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. 2003). 
2. In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Bob Mahl- 
burg, Senate Chief W a y  of Fetus Guardian Bill; Governor Fin& House Support, Won 'r Back Down 
on Legislation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 28,2004, at B 1. 
3. Pamela Manson, Mother is Charged in Stillborn Son S Death; Criminal Homicide: Prose- 
cutors Say the West Jordan Woman Ignored Numerous Warnings from Doctors and Refused a Sur- 
gery that Could Have Saved the BoyS Life; Prosecutors Say Mom Guilry in Baby's Death, SALT 
LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 12, 2004, at Al; Linda Thornson, Rowland Case Is Called 'Political,' 
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In roughly two-thirds of the states. women who write advance direc- 
tives to guide their medical care should they become incompetent may 
have their directives rendered unenforceable ifthey become pregnant.4 
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The last few years have witnessed an astonishing array of intrusive 
and punitive government actions against pregnant women. These gov- 
ernment interventions, ranging from criminal prosecutions and fetal 
"guardianship" proceedings to statutes safeguarding "the unborn" and 
new "regulatory interpretations" of existing law, are touted as necessary 
to protect fetuses from harm, particularly harm from their own mothers, 
and are framed as a response to a new public health c r i ~ i s . ~  While these 
government actions vary in the extent to which they threaten women's 
physical liberty and decision-making autonomy,6 they share a common 
view of pregnant women as vessels for the developing fetus, with both 
the potential, and the obligation, to protect that fetus at all costs. 
5. See Ziba Kashef, The Fetal Position: Federal and State Dollars Are Subsidizing a Boom 
in Antiabortion 'Crisis Pregnancy Centers,' MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2003, available at 
http://www.mothe jones.codnews/outfront/1lma~218~01 .html. Other government activities 
support the position that embryos and fetuses are full human beings, as the Bush Administration has 
funded so-called "Snowflake Adoptions" (the directed donation of embryos to infertile couples) and 
fetal imaging technology for "pregnancy crisis centers," whose raison d'&tre is to discourage women 
from choosing abortions. See Elissa K. Z i ~ S k y ,  Adoption S New Frontier, CBS News, July 28, 
2005, http://www.cbsnews.codstories/2005/O7/28/nationaYprintable7 1254 1 .shtml; Anna Mulrine, A 
Home for Frozen Embryos, USNEWS.COM, Sept. 27, 2004, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/ 
health/articles1040927/27babies.bl.htm (discussing the $1 million federal grant to two "embryo 
adoption" organizations to promote public awareness of these programs). The Department of Health 
and Human Services has funded so-called "crisis pregnancy centers" since 1996. See Kashef supra; 
see also The Abortion Access Project, Impeding the Right to Choose: Crisis Pregnancy Centers, and 
sources cited therein (on file with Author); Informed Choice Act, S.755.1S, 109th Cong. 5 2(a) 
(providing for additional funding for ultrasound equipment to be used to provide pregnant women 
with a visual image of the fetus). 
6. One might distinguish, for example, between prosecuting a woman for homicide because 
she used drugs while pregnant and a law that requires that pregnant women be told of the possibility 
of fetal pain before having an abortion. My point is not that all government "fetal protection" initia- 
tives are equivalent, but that they each diminish the ability of a competent adult to make choices 
about her life and her body, and does so based upon the actor's status as apregnant woman. 
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Current "fetal protection"7 efforts pack a triple whammy: they un- 
dermine women's health, limit women's ability to fully participate in the 
economic life of the nation, and disproportionately affect the indigent 
and racial minorities. First, the new "fetal protection" threatens to limit 
women's ability to participate in the workforce and control their repro- 
ductive capability by raising the specter of civil or criminal liability if 
they engage in potentially risky activities before or during pregnancy. 
Second, many "fetal protection" initiatives seek to redefine the fetus as a 
person, with rights fully equal to those of a born human being, in a thinly 
disguised effort to limit abortion a c c e s ~ . ~  Finally, efforts to constrain 
women's actions for the benefit of their fetuses frequently reflect racial, 
gender, and class stereotypes about how women in general, or certain 
groups of women, do or should b e h a ~ e . ~  It does not appear coincidental 
that poor women and women of color are the main targets of "fetal pro- 
tection" efforts. '' 
7. The term "fetal protection" was apparently first used by legal commentators in the early 
1980's, referring to employers' policies that excluded fertile women from the workplace, or at least 
better-paying jobs within the workplace. The ostensible purpose of these "fetal protection" policies 
was to ensure that children born to their female employees would not be injured by their mothers' 
on-the-job exposure to toxic chemicals, but the goal of protecting employers against tort liability was 
also important. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconcilia- 
tion of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 
(1981). In the mid-1980s the use of the term was broadened to include state laws prohibiting the 
experimentation on, and transfer of, embryos and fetuses, the fore-runner of today's controversy 
over stem cell research. See, e.g., Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the 
Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985). In the late 1980s, courts and commentators began to use 
the term "fetal protection" to encompass tort actions and criminal prosecutions of women based on 
their conduct during pregnancy, as well as broader questions about how to consider the interests of 
women and their fetuses in the abortion context. See, e.g., George Annas, The Impact of Medical 
Technology on the Pregnant Woman's Right to Privacy, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 213,229 (1987); John 
A. Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status: JustifLing Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 
189, 202 (1987); Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Government Regulation of Pregnant 
Women S Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 187-89 (1989). What I call the "new 'fetal 
protection"' is the increased range of government actions, beginning in the late 1990s and continuing 
through the present, taken against, or about, pregnant women, encompassing health care access and 
decisionmaking, civil commitment, and criminal and tort actions. 
8. Julia L. Ernst, Laura Katzive, & Erica Smock, The Global Pattern of U.S. Initiative Cur- 
tailing Women's Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U .  
PA. J. CONST. L. 752,781 (2004); see also infia text accompanying notes 41-47, (discussing in detail 
the debate surrounding Unborn Victims of Violence Act, Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004)). 
9. Indeed, some of the most aggressive criminal prosecutions of pregnant women brought in 
the name of fetal protection have been brought in the former slave states of Florida, Missouri, South 
Carolina, and Texas; although these states are not the only locus of prosecution. See infro note 66; 
see, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, 
and the Right of Privacy, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, A READER 127, 128-31 (Adrien Katherine 
Wing ed., New York University Press 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts 
Who Have Babies] (suggesting that the "devaluation of black women] as mothers . . . has its roots in 
the unique experience of slavery"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 938,939 (1997) [hereinafter Roberts, Unshackling Black MotherhoodJ 
10. See Ira J. Chasnoff, The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and 
Discrepancies in Mandatoly Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 
1206 (1990) (observing that black women were ten times as likely as white women to be reported by 
their physicians for using drugs, despite equal rates of drug use); LAURA E. G ~ M E Z ,  MISCONCEIVING 
MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 118 
(1997). Of course, one could observe that the poor and people of color are disproportionately repre- 
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Strikingly, the new "fetal protection" crusades have failed utterly to 
deliver more health care to poor children or women or to improve the 
health status of at-risk children. Rather, they are potent symbolic ges- 
tures, offering a quick fix to complex social, medical, and economic 
problems. By blaming individual women for conduct which is often not 
freely chosen," government avoids taking responsibility for its continu- 
ing failure to meaningfully address the reality that many poor and low- 
income Americans lack access to health care or acknowledge the special 
problems faced by women who are victims of domestic violence, suffer- 
ing from mental illness, and/or addicted to drugs and a l~oho l . ' ~  Effec- 
tive health policy requires the provision of adequate heath care services 
for all, including reproductive health care across the life span and tar- 
geted services addressing our most vulnerable women and children. 
This article will expand upon the feminist critique by focusing on 
children's health as well as the health and liberty interests of their moth- 
ers. In the first part of this article, I examine the legal and cultural un- 
derpinnings of "fetal protection" and explore its current manifestations. 
In the second part, I place "fetal protection" in a broader context, docu- 
menting the ways in which American law currently promotes fetal life, 
while simultaneously neglecting the lives and health of born children. 
The third part of the article offers concrete recommendations about how 
government, both state and federal, can actually achieve the goal of 
bringing healthy children into the world and enabling them to live 
healthy lives, paying particular attention to the problems of children who 
are born into domestic violence and/or poverty and are therefore at high 
risk for poor educational and health care outcomes.13 If we are to truly 
sented in the criminal justice system, in both the courts and prisons. See, e.g., William H. Edmon- 
son, Note, A "New" No-Contact Rule: Proposing an Addition to the No-Contact Rule to Address 
Questioning of Suspects Afer Unreasonable Charging Delays, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1773, 1785 
(2005). However, this does not explain the exhaordinary frequency and ferocity of criminal prose- 
cutions against women of color, particularly when one considers that it is alcohol, not crack cocaine 
(stereotypically connected with African-Americans), that is the drug most clearly shown to cause 
long-term developmental harm. See infia notes 14-22 and discussion in accompanying text. 
11. The theme of "choice" is frequently raised by proponents of "fetal protection," ignoring 
the reality that for many poor women, the systemic lack of health care, education, and employment 
denies them the ability to make optimal choices for themselves or their children. See, e.g., Erin 
Nelson, Reconceiving Pregnancy: Expressive Choice and Legal Reasoning, 49 MCGILL L.J. 593, 
623,624 (2004). 
12. There is a significant link between a woman's experiencing domestic violence (physical 
or sexual abuse) as a child or an adult and her subsequent development of mental illness andlor 
substance abuse problems. WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF PREGNANT 
AND PARENTING WOMEN WITH SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS IN PHILADELPHIA 4, 6 (Sept. 2002), 
available at h t t p : / / w w w . w o m e n s l a w p r o j e c t . o r g / r e p o r t s /  Lynn M .  
Paltrow, Pregnancy, Domestic Violence, and the Law: The Inte$ace of Medicine, Public Health, and 
the Law: Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8 
DEPAUL J .  HEALTH CARE L. 461,477 (2005). 
13. Poverty is a major contributor to poor birth outcomes and later childhood health problems. 
See Charles Oberg, The Impact of Childhood Poverty on Health and Development, HEALTHY 
GENERATIONS, May 2003, at 2-3, mailable at http://www.epi.umn.edu/mch/resources/ 
hgihg-childpoverty.pdf; Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Trajectories of Poverty and Chil- 
dren's Mental Health, 37 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 207,207 (1996). 
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become a society in which "no child [is] left behind," we must imple- 
ment a comprehensive public health strategy to promote women's and 
children's health across the lifespan, not just during the few months in 
which women are pregnant. 
What's "New " About the "New Fetal Protection? " 
At the outset, one might be tempted to ask, "What's all the fuss 
about? Are these government actions so different from those taken be- 
fore?" Women's use of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs during preg- 
nancy has long been contr~versial,'~ and there has been significant de- 
bate over whether criminal prosecutions and involuntary civil cornmit- 
ment are an appropriate or effective way to ensure that children are born 
healthy and drug-free.15 
Virtually all observers agree that drug use, broadly defined, during 
pregnancy is h a d l  to the newborn child, although there is disagree- 
ment about the extent, and permanence, of the harm.I6 Research shows 
that 5-6% of women use illegal drugs during pregnancy, while 25% used 
alcohol, and maternal alcohol use is the leading cause of mental retarda- 
tion. l7 Some researchers have concluded that maternal cocaine use may 
lead to subtle, long-lasting neurological deficits, including "the ability to 
habituate or self-regulate" and small but statistically significant deficits 
14. Currently, there is increasing attention paid to methamphetamine, which, like cocaine in 
its day, is giving rise to media stories about the grave risks of in utero drug exposure for the long- 
term development of children. See, e.g., Katie Zernike, A Drug Scourge Creates its Own Form of 
Orphan, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at Al; U.S. Warns of 'Global Meth Threat,' BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uW1/hi/world~americas/4757179.stm. Others have criticized this media coverage 
as sensational and poorly informed. See, e.g., Meth and Myrh: Top Doctors, Scientists and Specialist 
Warn Mass Media on "Merh Baby" Stories, July 29, 2005, 
http://stopthedrugwar.orgIchronicle/397/mean.sh; see also RYAN S. KING, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, THE NEXT BIG THING? METHAMPHETAMINE I  THE UNITED STATES 16 (June 
2006) (asserting that the media have failed utterly to accurately predict the science and epidemiol- 
ogical data surrounding methamphetamine addiction). 
15. See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Justice: A New Controversy in the Fetal-Rights Wars, 
NEWSWEEK, March 29, 2004, at 7; Lynn Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Abusers, Fetal Persons, and the 
Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1008, 1009 (1999); Brian Mamy, 'Fetal Abuse' 
Charges Give Rise to Debate; Mothers-to-Be Need Help, Not Fear, Critics Say, SALT LAKE 
TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 1997, at Dl; Wendy Chavkin, Vicki Breitbart, & Paul H. Wise, Finding Common 
Ground: The Necessity of an Integrated Agenda for Women's and Children's Health, 22 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 262, 263 (1994) (arguing that choosing to reduce infant mortality, HIV transmission, and 
drug exposure only by reducing harm to the fetus (and thus intervening through the body of the 
pregnant woman) ignores data showing that provision of quality health care across a woman's life is 
the best guarantee of ensuring healthy babies). 
16. See, e.g., DAN STEINBERG & SHELLY GEHSHAN, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLA~RES, TATES RESPONSES TO MATERNAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE: AN UPDATE (Jan. 
2000), www.ncsl.orgIpro~ealth~forum/mtema1ab~~e.htm; JANET R. HANKIN, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME PREVENTION 
RESEARCH (Aug. 2002), http://puhs.niaaa.nih.gov/publicatiom/arh26-1/5845.htm. 
17. Addiction Medicine: Psychopathology of Pregnant Women with Alcohol and Drug De- 
pendencies Examined, WOMEN'S HEALTH WEEKLY, August 23, 2001, at 8 [hereinafter Addiction 
Medicine]. 
Heinonline - -  84 Denv. U. L.  Rev. 542 2006-2007 
THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION" 
in IQ and language ability,18 but others have found that most infants ex- 
posed in utero to cocaine "catch up to their peers in physical size and 
health status by age 2."19 In contrast, maternal alcohol use during preg- 
nancy is known to cause serious harm to children with significant in 
utero exposure, and infants born to mothers who drank moderately while 
pregnant may still experience deficits in IQ, learning, and attenti~n.~' 
Using tobacco during pregnancy poses risks similar in type to those of 
~oca ine .~ '  Most recent research emphasizes the multiple factors leading 
to poor birth outcomes, including maternal poverty, homelessness, a his- 
tory of domestic violence, and lack of prenatal care, undermining the 
argument that drug use, whether legal or illegal, is the primary cause of 
children being born with deficits.22 
Recent "fetal protection" efforts have been most aggressive in the 
criminal arena. In an unprecedented use of criminal law's heaviest artil- 
lery, prosecutors in two instances filed murder charges against women 
who delivered stillborn infants, based, respectively, on the woman's drug 
use while pregnant23 or her refusal to have a Caesarean section.24 The 
result was a murder conviction in the first instance and a conviction for 
felony child endangerment in the second.25 Women have also been 
charged with other types of homicide26 and with child abuse or reckless 
18. Steven J. Ondersma et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure and Social Policy: The Search for an 
Appropriate Response, 5 CHILD MALTREATMENT 93, 95 (2000), available at http://cmx.sagepub. 
com/cgi/reprint/5/2/93. 
19. STEINBERG & GEHSHAN, supra note 16. 
20. Ondersma et al., supra note 18, at 96. 
21. N. Kistin, A. Handler, F. Davis, & C. Ferre, Cocaine and Cigaretfes: a Comparison of 
Risks, 10 PEDIATRIC PERMATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 269 (1996) (noting that while children exposed to 
cocaine in utero were more likely to have adverse birth outcomes than children whose pregnant 
mothers consumed no drugs, children whose mothers used tobacco products while pregnant were at 
risk for the same adverse outcomes as children whose mothers used cocaine, although the magnitude 
of the risk was lower. "[Gliven the greater number of cigarette smokers than cocaine users in the 
population . . . [there are likely to be more children harmed by their mothers' smoking than by their 
mothers' cocaine use during pregnancy]"). 
22. See, e.g., Ondersma et al., supra note 18, at 95; Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth, Devel- 
opment, and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure, 285 JAMA 1613, 
1615 (2001). Because some women who use illegal drugs also abuse alcohol, researchers recognize 
the need for comprehensive and intensive drug treatment programs that take into account the com- 
plex needs of this population, which has high "[rlates of homelessness, poverty, unemployment, and 
prostitution . . . [and] histories of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse." See Addiction Medicine, 
supra note 17. 
23. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171. 
24. Mom in Caesarean Case Gets Probation, CHI. TRIB., April 30,2004, at 18; see also Linda 
Thomson, Mother is Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET MORNING NEWS, March 12, 2004; 
Linda Thomson, RowlandAirs Her Case on Cable TV, DESERET MORNMG NEWS, May 13,2004. 
25. See McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171; Jacob Santini, Stillborn Twin Case Fades, Issues Stay, 
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, April 16, 2004, at B4. Criminal prosecutions against women who used 
alcohol or other drugs while pregnant began in the late 1980's. See infro note 66. However, in only 
one state, South Carolina, were these prosecutions and convictions ultimately sustained by the 
courts. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-79, 786 (S.C. 1997) (upholding conviction under 
child endangerment statute for drug use during pregnancy because viable fetus is a "child" under the 
statute); McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171. 
26. State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Aiwohi, 123 
P.3d 1210, 1210-1 1 (Haw. 2005). 
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endangerment based on their alcohol and drug use while pregnant,27 
relying on reports from physicians or newborn toxicology testing. Yet 
the unanimous judgment of medical and public heath groups is that such 
prosecutions will only drive a wedge between pregnant women and their 
physicians, and render it less, not more, likely that the women will seek 
appropriate pre- and post-natal care, including substance abuse treat- 
ment. 28 
In addition to criminal prosecutions, in the last several years, a 
breathtaking array of civil suits and statutory and regulatory initiatives 
has sought to treat fetuses as entirely separate from the pregnant women 
whose bodies sustain them. In 2002, the federal Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) issued regulations "clarify[ing] and ex- 
pand[inglV the statutory definition of "child" in the State Children's 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), a program which provides health 
care to low-income children.29 The regulations redefined "child," from 
"an individual under 19 years of agew3' to "an individual under the age of 
19 including the period from conception to birth."31 Critics asserted that 
this recasting of fetuses as "children" was both unnecessary and ineffec- 
tive if, as HHS claimed, its goal was to provide pregnant women with 
27. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 112-15 (discussing recent prosecutions 
initiated in Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and Wyoming). 
28. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001) (holding that public hospi- 
tal's policy of testing pregnant women for drug use, developed in conjunction with local prosecutors 
and police, and turning drug results over to authorities for criminal prosecution, did not come within 
the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment). The Court observed that "an intrusion on . 
. . [a patient's expectation of privacy in regard to diagnostic medical tests] may have adverse conse- 
quences because it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care." Id. at 78 n.14. In a 
separate article, I will explore in greater depth the anti-deterrent impact of criminal prosecutions on 
women seeking prenatal care and substance abuse treatment. 
29. SCHIP was established in 1997 under Title XXI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. $5 
1397aa-1397jj (2000), and gives states the opportunity to provide additional health insurance cover- 
age to children whose parents are too "wealthy" to qualify for Medicaid. Medicaid, which was 
enacted in 1965 and is authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. $8 1396v et 
seq., provides health care insurance for the very poorest of American children. BARRY R. FURROW 
ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 420-21 (4th ed. 2001). Both 
Medicaid and SCHlP are fedemustate partnerships, with the federal and state governments sharing in 
both the financing and administration of the two programs. However, there are important differ- 
ences. Medicaid is an entitlement program, in which all eligible persons must receive the same 
benefits. SCHIP gives states much more flexibility in terms of the services that a particular state 
may choose to provide. FURROW ET AL., supra, at 418-21,438-39; see also Sara Rosenbaum, Anne 
Markus, & Colleen Sonosky, Public Health Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from 
Medicaid to SCHIP, 1 1. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 3-12 (2004) (arguing that Medicaid, because it 
provides a more comprehensive set of benefits, including Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, 
and Treatment (EPSDT) is a superior program). Children who receive Medicaid "are more likely 
than uninsured children and as likely as privately insured children to receive well-child visits and to 
visit the doctor in a given year. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, 
MEDICAID FACTS, EARLY AND PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSTIC, AND TREATMENT SERVICES 
(Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MEDICAID FACTS], available at http:llwww.kff.orrglmedicaidlupload/Ear1y- 
and-Periodic-Screening-Diagnostic-and-Treatment-Services-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
30. 42 U.S.C. 5 1397jj(c)(l) (2000). 
3 1. 42 C.F.R. 5 457.10 (2006). 
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prenatal care.32 Instead, it appears that the real purpose of the regulation 
was to establish the legal principle that fetuses are children, with all the 
rights that accrue to that status.33 
Government lawyers have also sought the involuntary civil com- 
mitment of pregnant women, in order to impose "treatment" on the 
women and their fetuses,34 as well as court orders mandating Caesarean 
sections.35 While the avowed goal of these actions is to ensure the birth 
of healthy children, here too the consensus among medical professionals 
is that such interventions are ~n jus t i f i ed .~~  More than thlrty states7 laws 
permit civil commitment based on the use of alcohol and other 
32. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, THE MEDICAID EXPANSIONS FOR PREGNANT 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1995). 
33. For example, in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986 Congress 
expanded Medicaid to permit states to enroll all pregnant women with incomes up to 100% of the 
Federal Poverty Level and adopted procedural changes that made enrollment easier, thus signifi- 
cantly increasing the number of pregnant women eligible to receive pre- and post-natal care as a 
means of ensuring better birth outcomes. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-509, $ 9401(b)(2), 100 Stat. 1874 (1986); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
PRENATAL CARE: EARLY SUCCESS IN ENROLLING WOMEN MADE ELIGIBLE BY MEDICAID 
EXPANSIONS 7 (February 1991), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d2lt9/143346.pdf. While these 
changes in the Medicaid program were not totally effective in achieving the birth of healthier chil- 
dren, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 1-2, no one had ever suggested that 
the result would be better if the fetuses were enrolled rather than the women in whose bodies they 
were developing. 
34. These include the case of State ex rel. Angela M. W. v Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 732 
(Wis. 1997) and Rebecca Comeau, a pregnant woman who belonged to a religious sect that did not 
believe in Westem medicine, who was confined in a "secure hospital facility for pregnant prison 
inmates" by a Massachusetts juvenile court judge until she agreed to medical examination and treat- 
ment. See Marilyn L. Miller, Note, Fetal Neglect and State Intervention: Preventing Another Attle- 
boro Cult Baby Death, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 71, 71 (2001). These cases will be discussed in 
more detail in Part I. C., infra. 
35. News . . . Husband to Challenge Court Order in Lmvsuit over Wfe's Refusal of Caesar- 
ean Section, PENN. LAW WEEKLY, Jan. 26, 2004, at 9; Associated Press, New Questions about 
Childbirth Rights, May 19,2004, http://keyetv.com/healtb/bealth-story_l40 1 10423.hhnl (discussing 
the case of Amber Marlowe, who was the subject of an ex parte order to have a Caesarean section 
because her fetus weighed 11 pounds, despite her having delivered 6 very large children previously). 
36. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY H-420.969: LEGAL 
INTERVENTIONS DURING PREGNANCY, available at http://www.ama- 
assn.org/ama~noindex/category/11760.html, (click "accept," search "420.969") (propounding a 
general rule that "filudicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has made an informed 
refusal of a medical treatment designed to benefit her fetus" and specifically recognizing the need 
for rehabilitative treatment for pregnant substance abusers); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS 
AND GYNECOLOGY, Patient Choice in the Maternal-Fetal Relationship, in ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS 
AND GYNECOLOGY (2d ed. 20041, available at 
http://www.acog.orgl6om~home/publicationethics/ethicsO34.pdf (stating that "court-ordered 
intervention against the wishes of a pregnant woman is rarely if ever acceptable"); American Acad- 
emy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Feral Therapy - Ethical Considerations, 103 
PEDIATRICS 1061, 1062 (May 1999) (after discussing the range of medical interventions to promote 
fetal health and the legal-ethical issues involved, concluding that "Under no circumstances should a 
physician physically intervene [to insist on medical treatment] without the explicit consent of the 
pregnant woman without judicial review . . . ."). 
37. ALA. CODE. $ 22-52-1.2 (LexisNexis 2006) ; ALASKA STAT. $ 47.37.190 (2006); ARK. 
CODE ANN. $ 20-64-815 (2006); CAL. WEL & INST CODE 5 3050 peering 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. 
$ 25-1-1 107 (2006); COW. GEN. STAT. $ 17a-685 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, $ 2212 (2006); 
D.C. CODE ANN. $7-1303.04 (LexisNexis 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. $ 397.675 (LexisNexis 2006); 
GA. CODE ANN. $ 37-7-41 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 334.60.2 (LexisNexis 2006); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. $ 66-329 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. $ 12-23-1 1-1 (LexisNexis 2006); IOWA CODE $ 
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and several states have recently enacted laws specifically authorizing the 
civil commitment of pregnant women based on substance abuse.38 Fur- 
ther, a majority of states which authorize the use of advance medical 
directives to govern the medical care of mentally incompetent individu- 
als suspend the operation of these directives if the patient is pregnant.39 
In June 2003, the wife of a Florida prosecutor sought to be ap- 
pointed "guardian" of the fetus of a mentally disabled patient who lived 
in a group home in order to prevent the woman from having an abor- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  Although the Florida courts ultimately rejected the suit, the case 
became a cause celkbre in Florida. 
In March 2004, Congress enacted the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act (the UVVA or ~ c t ) , ~ '  which made it a crime to injure or cause the 
death of a fetus while committing another federal offense.42 Both sup- 
porters and opponents of the Act acknowledged the significant problem 
of violence against pregnant women;43 however, opponents objected to 
the Act's solution. Rather than focusing on the injury suffered by the 
pregnant woman herself and providing that a person who harms a preg- 
nant woman who in the process injures or kills the fetus should receive 
125.75 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. 59-29b54 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 2854 (2006); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 123, 35 (LexisNexis 2006); MISS. CODE. ANN. 41-30-27 (2004); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 71-919 (LexisNexis 2006), see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 71-908 (LexisNexis 
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 135-C:27 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. 43-2-8 (LexisNexis 2006); 
N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-04.1-22 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS 21-28.2-3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. 44- 
52-50 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 5 29A-5-31] (2006); TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 8 
574.034 (Vernon 2006); VA. CODE ANN 37.2-809 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 70.96A.140 
(LexisNexis 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-2 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. 51.15 (2006); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. 25-10-1 10 (2006). Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota have involuntary 
commitment laws specifically for pregnant women who use drugs. MINN. STAT. 626.5561 (2006); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, 5 5-410 (2005); see also Om.  STAT. tit. 63 5 1-546.5 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS 34-20A-70 (2006). 
38. See, e.g., Wrs. STAT. $ 8  48.205 (2006) (permitting the civil commitment of pregnant girls 
and women, dubbed 'The Cocaine Mom law"); see also Tom Kertscher, 'Cocaine Mom' Law In- 
voked in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without 
Other Crime, ~ W A U K E E  JOURNAL SENT~NEL, Nov. 5,1999, at 1. 
39. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
40. This attempt was rejected by the Florida District Court of Appeal in In re Guardianship of 
J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which held that under the Florida guardian- 
ship statute, a guardian can be appointed only for a "person," and that fetuses were not "persons" 
under Florida law. Id. at 538. 
41. Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004). 
42. 18 U.S.C.A. 1841 (West 2006). The Act enumerated a lengthy list of federal offenses, 
including drive-by shootings in connection with drug offenses (18 U.S.C.A. $ 36), violence at inter- 
national airports (18 U.S.C.S. § 37), and assault on a federal officer or employee (I8 U.S.C.A. § 
111). See 18 U.S.C.A. 1841(b)(l). 
43. H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, Pt. 1, at 4 n.2 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (citing Victoria Frey, Examin- 
ing Homicide 's Contribution to Pregnancy-Associated Deaths, 285 JAMA 15 10 (200 1) (summariz- 
ing the various studies)); Isabelle L. Horon & Diana Cheng, Enhanced Surveillance for Pregnancy- 
Associated Mortality-Madand, 1993-1998,285 JAMA 1455 (2001); Linn H. Parsons & Margaret 
A. Harper, Violent Maternal Deaths in North Carolina, 94 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 990, 991 (1999); 
Dannenberg et a]., Homicide and Other Injuries as Causes of Maternal Death in New York City. 
1987 through 1991,172 AM. J .  OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1557 (1995); Fildes et al., Trauma: The Leading 
Cause of Maternal Mortality, 32 J .  TRAUMA 643-45 (1992). 
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an enhanced penalty for that harm,44 the UVVA makes such an attack or 
injury a separate crime.45 To do so, the UVVA defines "unborn child" 
broadly, as "a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of de- 
,946 velopment . . . . Like the SCHIP regulation, this language raises con- 
cern that the statute's real goal is to limit women's ability to obtain an 
ab~rtion.~' 
Most recently, laws have been proposed which emphasize fetal 
"personhood" in new ways. These include laws requiring women seek- 
ing abortion to be told about fetal pain,48 to be informed of the need to 
prepare a fetal death certificate, or to be given the opportunity to view a 
sonogram or listen to the heartbeat of their fetus prior to deciding to have 
an ab~rtion.~' Supporters of these statutes justify them as providing "in- 
formed consent," but the statutes are unusual in mandating the substan- 
tive details of what patients contemplating a medical procedure must be 
told. In contrast, most American informed consentS0 law focuses on the 
process of ensuring full communication between patients and their health 
care providers rather than on the content of the physician-patient dia- 
logueYs1 relying on the health care professional to determine what infor- 
mation to convey to a particular patient based on her individual needs. 
44. Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed an amendment to the Senate bill to accomplish this, 
which was defeated by a vote of 50-49, largely along party lines. A similar amendment offered by 
Representative Zoe Lofgren was also defeated in the House of Representatives, by a 229-186 vote. 
Edward Epstein, Bill to Make Harming Fetus a Crime is Passed by Senate; Assailant ofa  Pregnant 
Woman Could be Charged with 2 Separate Federal Ofenses, S. F .  CHRON., March 26,2004, at Al; 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, Pt. 1, at 86. 
45. 18 U.S.C.A. 5 1841 (West 2006). 
46. 18 U.S.C.A. 5 1841(d). Under the law, "the term unborn child means a child in utero, and 
the term "child in utero" or "child. who is in utero" means a member of the s~ecies homo sa~iens. at 
any stage of development, who is carried in the womb." See also 10 u.S'.C.A. 5 919a(2) (west 
2006). 
47. Senator Feinstein argued that the U W A  was a deliberate effort to undermine abortion 
rights, by "'set[ting] . . . the stage for a jurist to rule that a human being an any stage of development 
deserves . . . rights under the law' . . . ." Epstein, supra note 46. 
48. See S.51, 109th Cong. 5 2902 (2005) (proposed by Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas, a 
fierce abortion opponent); H.B. 238, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005). Both bills are discussed 
infra in text accompanying notes 244-252. 
49. See discussion infra in Section I.D. The way for these laws has been paved by federal 
funding of fetal imaging machinery, through federal and state grants that are given to organizations 
that promote "abstinence only" sex education. The so-called "pregnancy crisis centers" have been a 
major beneficiary of such grants. Kashef, supra note 5; The Abortion Access Project, supra note 5. 
50. Informed consent doctrine has roots in both the common law tort of battery and in negli- 
gence. It protects a patient's interest in choosing when to be touched (a battery is an unconsented 
touching and includes medical treatment which the patient did not agree to). See, e.g., Schloendofi 
v. The Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). It also ensures that a patient 
receives medical treatment from a physician who has explained to the patient those risks and benefits 
of treatment that a reasonable patient would wish to know. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772,787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 5 2805-d ( M c K i ~ e y  2001). 
51. For example, some abortion statutes require that the pregnant woman be told certain 
details about the fetus, such as its gestational age and its potential to survive outside the womb, and 
be informed of the availability of medical assistance for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, 
as well as options for child support and adoption. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN 5 40:1299.35.6 
(2006); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN $171.012 (Vernon 2003); Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833,881 (1992). In addition, there are other areas of health care in which state laws 
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In sum, the mounting numbers of civil and criminal actions against 
pregnant women, along with statutes and regulations equating fetuses 
with born children, mean that the new "fetal protection" crusade can no 
longer be ignored. These government initiatives are particularly disturb- 
ing because their focus on the harm that could be caused by a woman's 
behavior during pregnancy ignores the widespread failings of the Ameri- 
can health care system, which does not promote women's and children's 
health. 
The United States falls far short of other developed countries in ob- 
jective indicators of health status,52 and indeed, American infant mortal- 
ity rates have risen in recent years.53 Two-thirds of American infants 
who die in their first year of life suffer from low birthweight, attributable 
in part to their mothers' lack of prenatal care and long-standing health 
problems, as well as to multiple births.54 One-eighth of American chil- 
dren are born pre-term, at an estimated cost of $26 billion per year.55 
There are significant racial disparities in birth outcomes and other meas- 
ures of children's health, which reflect major problems of health care 
access, including the lack of a primary care physician and the lack of 
health insurance.56 More than ten million American children have no 
mandate that patients (usually women) be told of alternative medical or surgical options. See, e.g., 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 8 1690 (West 2006) (sterilization); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 436.225 
(West 2003) (sterilization); S.G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast 
Cancer Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. 5 6-18- 
702 (West 2006) (childhood vaccination). Medical procedures that are less politically charged rarely 
have such "informed consent" requirements. 
52. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH PROGRAMS, PLANNING FOR 
HEALTHY FAMILIES (June 2004), available at http://amchp.org/aboutamchp/publications/ 
familyplanning2004.pdf (noting that the United States ranks 29th in the world in infant mortality and 
arguing that more attention should be devoted to encouraging family planning as a way of ensuring 
good birth outcomes, as data show that when pregnancies are intended children are less llkely to be 
born premature and with health problems); Margaret A. Harper et al, Pregnancy-Related Death and 
Health Care Services, 102 OBSTETRICS &GYNECOLOGY 273,273,275,276 (Aug. 2003), available 
at http://www.greenjoumal.org/cgi/reprint/l02/2/273 (noting that "[mlaternal mortality statistics for 
the United States have shown little improvement for 2 decades, and 20 countries have lower rates," 
and concluding in a study of North Carolina maternal pregnancy deaths that lacking access to prena- 
tal care made maternal death slightly more likely and having a Caesarean section made maternal 
death nearly four times as likely). See also detailed discussion in Part II.B, infra. 
53. T.J. Matthews, RaciaNEthnic Disparities in Infant Mortalip United States, 1995-2002, 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, June 10,2005. 
54. Id. See also ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 2004 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, 34 (2005), 
available at www.kidscount.org [hereinafter CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT]. Low birthweight 
is also linked significantly to being born as a twin or other multiple births. Id. at 34; Tarun Jain et 
a]., Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice and in Outcomes of the Use ofAssisted Reproductive Tech- 
nology in the United States, 350 N. E. J. MED. 1639, 1640 (2004). 
55. Press Release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Births Cost U.S. $26 Billion a Year; Multid- 
isciplinary Research Effort Needed to Prevent Early Births (July 13, 2006), available at 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?Recor=l1622 [hereinafter IOM 
Report]. The Report defmes "preterm" as any birth that occurs at less than 37 weeks of pregnancy (a 
full-term pregnancy is 38-42 weeks post-conception) and notes that the rate of pre-term births has 
risen 30% since 1981. Id. 
56. IOM Report, supra note 55; Matthews, supra note 53 (noting significant racial disparities 
in infant mortality rates within and across states); Kenneth E. Thorpe, Jennifer Flome & Peter Joski, 
The Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage Among Pregnant Women, 1999 (Emory University 
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health insurance at all," even though at least 70% live in families where 
at least one parent works full time.58 
If the goal of government policymakers and prosecutors were actu- 
ally to ensure that more children are born healthy and have the opportu- 
nity to stay that way, the United States would adopt radically different 
policies. In addition to the lack of health care access, two notable omis- 
sions from the rhetoric of fetal protection are the harms posed to children 
by assisted reproductive technology (ART), used largely by the middle 
and upper classes,59 and the risk to all children posed by environmental 
April 2001) (identifying disparities in health insurance coverage along racial, employment status, 
and income lines) (paper prepared for the March of Dimes, on file with the author). 
57. KAISER COMMISSION O MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID FACTS, ENROLLING 
UNINSURED LOW-INCOME CHILDREN IN MEDICAID AND SCHIP (March 2005) (summarizing 2002 
data), available at http:Nwww.kff.orrglmedicaid/2177-04.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, ENROLLING 
CHILDREN]. In 2005, more than 12% of children under age 18 lacked health insurance for at least 
part of the previous year. ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW 
SURVEY, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2005, 3 (Mar. 20, 2006). available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/daWnhis/ear1yreIease/insur200603.pdf. "[U]ninsured but Medicaid- 
eligible children are twice as likely as those enrolled in Medicaid to have an unmet medical need, to 
have not seen a doctor, and to have substantial family out-of-pocket spending on health care." 
KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra. 
58. Associated Press, Most Uninsured Children Have Parents with Jobs, Sept. 28, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com~printer~friendly~~tory/O,3566,2 1 338,OO.html. 
59. What has been absent from the government initiatives described above are any efforts to 
regulate the new assisted reproductive technologies (ARTS) designed to address problems of infertil- 
ity, which increase the risk of adverse birth outcomes, but which are used primarily by middle- and 
upper- income Americans. See, e.g., Jain, supra note 54, at 1640 (noting the continuing high rate of 
multiple births in the United States and their adverse consequences, but observing that the United 
States, in contrast to many other countries, has not regulated ART practices, "in part because of the 
basic belief that such decisions should be left to couples and their physicians"); Liza Mundy, A 
Special Kind of Poverty: The Poor Get Used to Going Without, but Going Without a Baby is Hard to 
Get Used to, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,2003, at W08 (describing costs of infertility treatments and how 
poor men .and women seek subsidized or alternative access to fertility treatment). People who use 
ART are much more likely than the rest of the population to have twins or other multiple births, 
which in turn dramatically increases the chances of having a low birthweight infant (one who weighs 
less than 2500 grams, or about 5.5. pounds), from 6% to 57%. See CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS 
COUNT, supra note 54, at 34. Low birth weight is a major contributor to infant mortality and devel- 
opmental defects. Id. Yet even singleton births achieved through ART are at risk for harm. Jennifer 
L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them 
From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 60, 62-66, 69-70, 77-80 (summarizing the data showing that 
up to 10% of children born using ART suffer some adverse consequences and criticizing the regula- 
tory hands-off position of states and the federal government); see also John A. Robertson, Procrea- 
tive Liberty and Harm to Oflspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 9 (2004) (not- 
ing that intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), which is used in nearly half of American in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) treatments, may cause a higher incidence of rare birth defects as well as low birth 
weight). But see Anja Pinborg et al., Neurological Sequelae in Twins Born Afer Assisted Concep- 
tion: Controlled National Cohort Study, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 3 1 1 (July 15 2004) (finding no difference 
in adverse birth outcomes between infants conceived through ICSI and NF ,  but noting that children 
born through ART methods have higher rates of stillbirths and neurological problems). See also 
PHILIP G .  PETERS, JR., HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? OBLIGATIONS TO THE CHILDREN OF 
REPRODUCTIVE T CHNOLOGY (2004). Similarly, the bioethics issues raised by particular uses of 
IVF are generally ignored. Arlene Judith Klotzko, Medical Miracle or Medical Mischiefr The Saga 
of the McCaughley Septuplets, Hastings Center Report 5 (May 1998); Susan M. Wolf, Jeffrey P. 
Kahn, & John E. Wagner, Using Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell Donor: 
Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 3 1 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 33 1 (2003) (arguing that the combination 
of IVF technology with preimplantation genetic diagnosis in order to produce a child who is a poten- 
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hazards, including mercury in fish6' and the forests6' to pesticides62 to 
lead from older buildings and manufacturing.63 The United States has 
also failed to promote fetal and children's health and development by 
providing paid parenting leaves.64 When compared to other developed 
nations where universal health care and subsidized parenting leave are 
the norm,6s the approach of the United States is both seriously out of step 
and actively unhelpful in promoting childhood health. 
tial organ donor for a sibling with a rare genetic disorder is so ethically questionable that it should 
only take place under human subject research protocols which have been thoroughly reviewed by 
institutional review boards). Only recently have suggestions been made that ART should be moni- 
tored and regulated. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES, XECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-9 (March 
2004), available at www.bioethics.gov. Due to the volatile politics evoked by discussions of fetal 
and embryonic life, little regulation is likely to occur anytime soon. Rosato, supra, at 74, 75. In 
July 2006 the Institute of Medicine issued a report noting the 30% increase in pre-term labor over 
the last 25 years, and urging further study of the contribution of ART to this growth. IOM Report, 
supra note 55. 
60. Many species of fish pose risks to adults, children, and fetuses, primarily through expo- 
sure to mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB). "Children born to women exposed to high 
levels of methylmercury [the organic form of mercury found naturally in the environment] during or 
before pregnancy may face numerous health problems, including brain damage, mental retardation, 
blindness, and seizures. Lower levels of methylmercury exposure in the womb have caused subtle 
but irreversible deficits in learning ability." Jennifer Fisher Wilson, Balancing the Risks and Benefits 
of Fish Consumption, 141 ANNALS INT. MED. 977,978 (2004). PCBs are a probable carcinogen. In 
addition, "[iln children, PCB exposure in utero and flom breast milk consumption has been linked 
with neurodevelopmental delays, impaired cognition, immune problems, and alterations in male 
reproductive organs." Id. at 979. 
61. Anthony DePalma, Study of Songbirds Finds High Levels of Mercury, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 
25,2006, at B1. 
62. A number of widely-used pesticides are suspected of being endocrine disrupters, which 
affect both male and female reproductive systems and increase the chances of infertility and other 
reproductive h a m .  SHARON L. DROZDOWSKI & STEPHEN G. WHITTAKER, WASHINGTON STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES' SAFETY & HEALTH ASSESSMENT & RESEARCH FOR 
PREVENTION PROGRAM, WORKPLACE HAZARDS TO REPRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: A 
RESOURCE FOR WORKERS, EWLOYERS, HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, AND HEALTH & SAFETY 
PERSONNEL 48,49 (Aug. 1999). 
63. Lead poses risks to male and female workers, as well as their children. In men, lead 
exposure leads to lowered sperm counts, abnormal sperm shapes, altered sperm transfer, and altered 
hormone levels. The results can be sterility and infertility. In women, lead can cause miscarriages, 
stillbirths, and infertility, as well as developmental disorders in children exposed in utero. NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE EFFECTS OF WORKPLACE HAZARDS ON 
FEMALE REPRODUCnVE HEALTH 2-3 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/99- 
104.html. Lead that workers bring home on their skin, hair, clothes, tool box or car can cause severe 
lead poisoning for everyone who comes into contact with if and can lead to neurobehavioral and 
growth effects in a fetus. NATIONAL INsnmn! FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE 
EFFECTS OF WORKPLACE HAZARDS ON MALE R E P R O D U ~  HEALTH (1997), 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh~ malrepro.html. 
64. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), dis- 
cussed infa in text accompanying notes 329-44, requires employers of more than fifty employees to 
permit employees to take an unpaid leave for their own illness or a family member's birth, adoption, 
or illness. However, in contrast to almost all developed countries, the United States does not man- 
date paid leave. KURT H. DECKER, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE IN A NUTSHELL 9-14 (2000). 
65. Sakiko Tanaka, Parental Leave and Child Health Across OECD Counfries, 115 THE 
ECON. J. F7, F8, F9 (Royal Economic Society 2005). 
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A. Criminal Prosecutions 
Criminal actions against pregnant women have risen sharply in the 
last decade. Although women have been prosecuted for drug and alcohol 
use during pregnancy in more than half the states since the 1970s, courts 
have quashed prosecutions or overturned convictions in all but one state, 
South ~ a r o l i n a . ~ ~  There the courts have upheld women's convictions for 
homicide and child abuse based on their conduct during pregnancy.67 
Virtually all the women who faced these criminal charges were living at 
the very margins of society, suffering from poverty, substance abuse, and 
often, mental d i~abi l i ty .~~  Frequently they were sexually abused as chil- 
dren, and often they are current victims of domestic violence.69 
In 1996, Deborah J.Z. was charged with attempted first-degree in- 
tentional homicide7' and first-degree reckless injuryY7l after she went 
into labor while at a tavern and said that she would drink herself and her 
fetus to death.72 Her child was born with a high blood alcohol level and 
physical features showing fetal alcohol effects.73 Although the Wiscon- 
sin Supreme Court condemned her conduct, it barred criminal prosecu- 
tion because under Wisconsin's "born alive" rule, a fetus was not a hu- 
66. The first reported effort at prosecution was in 1977, when a California prosecutor indicted 
Margaret Reyes on two counts of felony child endangering based on her heroin use while pregnant, 
which allegedly caused her twin sons to be born addicted to heroin. The California Court of Appeal 
issued a writ or prohibition, enjoining further prosecution of the case. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 
Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). A rash of prosecutions began in the late 1980s, beginning with 
the 1987 prosecution of Pamela Rae Stewart, who had intercourse with her husband and used am- 
phetamines, both against medical advice. See George Annas, The Impact of Medical Technology on 
the Pregnant Woman S Right to Privacy, 13 AM J .  L. & MED. 213,229 (1987). Since then, at least 30 
states have prosecuted women for manslaughter, child abuse or endangerment, or drug delivery to a 
minor. See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT WOMEN FOR THEIR 
BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY: AN APPROACH THAT UNDERMINES WOMEN'S HEALTH AND 
CHILDREN'S hTrERESTS 2 [hereinafter CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT 
WOMEN], available at http:Nwww.reproductiverights.org/pdElpubbpunishinomen.pdf (listing 
cases wherein women have been prosecuted for behavior during pregnancy). 
67. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997) (upholding conviction under child 
endangerment statute for drug use during pregnancy because viable fetus is a "child" under the 
statute); see also State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. 2003) (upholding conviction for 
homicide by child abuse). 
68. See Cm. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT WOMEN, supra note 66, at 
2. 
69. See WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 7; see also Paltrow, supra note 12, at 477. 
70. WlS. STAT. ANN. 5 940.01 (West 2005) ("[Flirst-degree intentional homicide" [provides 
that:] "(a) . . . whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or 
another is guilty of a Class A felony."). 
71. 5 940.23 ("[R]eckless injury" [provides that:] "(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily 
harm to another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is 
guilty of a Class D felony."). 
72. Deborah J.Z. "allegedly told a nurse that 'if you don't keep me here, I'm just going to go 
home and keep drinking and drink myself to death and I'm going to kill this thing because I don't 
want it anyways."' Deborah J.Z. also expressed fear about the pain of giving birth and the baby's 
race. State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490,491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
73. Deborah J.Z., 569 N.W.2d at 491. The baby's blood alcohol level at birth was 0.199%. 
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man being.74 The court cited the ongoing debate over whether substance 
abuse should be addressed through treatment or punishment, noting the 
concern that threatening criminal prosecution could deter women from 
seeking prenatal care.75 The court held that to permit prosecution of 
Deborah Z. would mean that "a woman could risk criminal charges for 
any perceived self-destructive behavior during her pregnancy that may 
result in injuries to her unborn child . . . [including] smoking or abusing 
legal medications . . . [or] 'the failure to secure adequate prenatal medi- 
cal care and overzealous behavior, such as excessive exercising or diet- 
ing. "'76 
In 1999, Regina McKnight, a homeless Afican-American woman 
with an IQ of 72 and an addiction to crack cocaine, delivered a stillborn 
When she and the child tested positive for cocaine metabolites, 
she was charged with homicide by child abuse.'* McKnight was con- 
victed and sentenced to twenty years in prison.79 The South Carolina 
Supreme Court upheld her conviction, rejecting McKnight's arguments 
that there was insufficient evidence to show causation or mens rea." 
The court also rebuffed her argument that she was denied due process by 
being prosecuted for homicide when the South Carolina legislature had 
not enacted a statute declaring that a fetus was a child. The court relied 
on its prior decisions upholding convictions for felony child abuse based 
74. Id. at 496. Wisconsin law defines a "human being" as "one who has been born alive." 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.22 (16). The court explained its decision as required by the rule of strict 
construction of penal laws and by deference to the legislature in a complex public policy area. 
Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 494-95. 
75. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 495. The court's concern is supported by a study of low- 
income women who delivered their babies at an inner city hospital in Detroit, who stated their belief 
that if Michigan adopted a law mandating that women whose babies tested positive for drugs would 
be sent to jail, substance-abusing women would be less likely to seek prenatal care, drug testing, or 
drug treatment. When the study's authors attempted to interview women in a state with a law that 
threatened incarceration, all known drug users refused to participate in the study out of fear of self- 
incrimination. See Marilyn L. Poland et al., Punishing Pregnant Drug Users: Enhancing the Flight 
from Care, 3 1 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 199,201 -02 (1 993). 
76. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 494-95 (citing Hillman v. Georgia, 503 S.E.2d 610, 613 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998)). 
77. Robyn E. Blummer, Moralists' New Target: Pregnant Women, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Aug. 10,2003, at 7D; McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171, 173 (S.C. 2003). 
78. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171, 173. Under title 16, article 3, section 85 of the South Caro- 
lina Code, a person may be found guilty of "homicide by child abuse" if he "causes the death of a 
child under the age of eleven while committing child abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under 
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 
(2005). 
79. See McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171. The court suspended the sentence upon service of 
twelve years in prison. 
80. The court rejected Ms. McKnight's argument that the evidence was insufficient to survive 
her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, finding that there was evidence of her "extreme indif- 
ference to human life" based on her use of cocaine during pregnancy in light of South Carolina 
precedents which upheld felony child abuse convictions based on a woman's drug use while preg- 
nant, holding that both she and women in South Carolina generally were on ample notice that the use 
of cocaine while pregnant causes fetal harm. The court also found sufficient evidence to send the 
case to the jury on the causation question, despite evidence that in approximately 40% of stillbirths it 
is impossible to make a medical judgment about the cause of death. Id. at 172,73. 
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on a woman's drug use while pregnant as providing sufficient notice," 
effectively ignoring her argument that her crime could not be homicide, 
because a fetus cannot be treated as a child under criminal law unless the 
legislature expressly declares it to be so.'' The court also spurned 
McKnight's argument that the homicide prosecution violated her right to 
privacy and autonomy.83 Further, the court rejected her argument that a 
twenty-year prison term for the stillbirth of a child was unconstitutional 
under the Eight Amendment, insisting that the proper comparison was to 
criminal abortion,84 rather than to other murders.85 
The McKnight decision was condemned around the nation, as un- 
fairly singling out a poor, African-American woman for unprecedented 
criminal punishment, while failing to address the underlying problems of 
addiction and lack of health care access. Critics charged that threatening 
drug-abusing pregnant women with criminal prosecution, rather than 
providing them with social and economic support and effective drug re- 
habilitation, would drive women away from treatment, out of fear that 
they would lose their babies or be imprisoned.86 
Similar concern was expressed when, in 2003, a Hawaii prosecutor 
charged Tayshea Aiwohi with manslaughter based on her use of 
methamphetamine while pregnant, which caused the death of her infant 
two days after birth." MS. Aiwohi was not charged until two years after 
her child's death, when she had successfully completed a drug treatment 
program.88 Both the prosecutor and the trial judge spoke of the need to 
hold her accountable and to send a message to prevent other mothers 
from using drugs while pregnant.89 The trial judge also rejected any 
suggestion that Aiwohi's addiction might be a mitigating factor, declar- 
ing that, 
81. Id. at 176 (citing Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997)). 
82. The maximum sentence for a woman who procures an abortion in South Carolina is two 
years and the crime is a misdemeanor. S.C. CODE ANN. $44-41-80@) (2002). 
83. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 176-77. 
84. Id. at 174, 177. The court declined to address McKnight's contention that the abortion 
statute was applicable, saying that she had not preserved the issue for appellate review. Id. at 174. 
85. Id. at 174, 177. The court compared McKnight's sentence to the sentence received by 
other convicted murderers in South Carolina, and murderers of children in other states. Id. 
86. See, e.g., Kirsten Scharnberg, Prosecutors Targeting Pregnant Drug Users; Some Fear 
Women Will Shun Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23,2003, at C1; Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Tests 
the Boundr of a Fetus's Rights, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 28,2001, USA Section at 1. 
87. See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1210-13 (Haw. 2005). 
88. See id.; see also State v. Aiwohi, FCCR03-1-0036 (Haw. Aug. 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.courts.state.hi.us (use search function with the name "Aiwohi" and then use the hyper- 
link for the case file FCCR03-1-0036). 
89. See id. The trial judge ruled that "the State, with good reason, has served clear notice that 
such conduct can and will result in serious felony charges brought where the child is born alive and 
later dies or suffers injury due to knowing, intentional or reckless drug use." The prosecutor "hailed 
the judge's remarks" finding the indictment was necessary "to get justice for the baby" and to hold 
the mother accountable. Ken Kobayashi, Mother Gets Probation in Ice Death, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Aug. 26,2004, at 1B. 
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[Dlrug usage, including the use of crystal methamphetamine is a mat- 
ter of choice and not an illness. Certainly it is a conscious choice to 
obtain and use the drug initially and worse yet, while pregnant . . . . 
If drug usage were an illness from the get go, we would today be in 
[a] medical center with a physician present in a diagnosis, treatment 
mode.90 
Ms. Aiwohi pleaded no contest in order to appeal the denial of her mo- 
tion to dismiss, and received a twenty-year prison sentence, which was 
suspended on condition that she comply with the terms of probation for 
the next ten years.91 The Supreme Court of Hawaii overturned the con- 
viction, holding that one of the elements of manslaughter was the atten- 
dant circumstance that the victim be a person at the time of the defen- 
dant's conduct.92 
Yet even after McKnight and Aiwohi, few observers were prepared 
for the 2004 prosecution of Melissa Rowland for capital murder in Utah 
after she declined to have a recommended Caesarean section and her son 
was Like Ms. McKnight, Ms. Rowland was a vulnerable 
woman with few resources. Her own mother died shortly after birth, and 
Melissa Rowland had a history of serious mental illness dating from 
childhood, as well as substance abuse problems.94 Ms. Rowland moved 
to Utah to deliver her children at the request of the adoption agency that 
was handling their adoption because Utah's loose adoption laws made 
adoption easier.95 In Utah, she lived on Social Security disability pay- 
ments and a $100 weekly stipend from the adoption agency; she also 
used cocaine and tobacco.96 Ms. Rowland sought help at three hospitals 
because she could not feel fetal movements, but rejected their advice to 
have a Caesarean section (c-~ection).~' None of the hospitals sought a 
court order requiring a C-section or made any other effort to provide Ms. 
Rowland with medical treat~nent.~' However, after Ms. Rowland deliv- 
ered a stillborn son and a living daughter, she was arrested and charged 
with murder.99 After spending more than three months in jail, Rowland 
90. See State v. Aiwohi, FCCR03-1-0036 (Haw. Aug. 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.courts.state.hi.us (use search function with the name "Aiwohi" and then use the hyper- 
link for the case file FCCR03-1-0036). 
91. See id. 
92. See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210,1223 (Haw. 2005). 
93. Linda Thomson & Pat Reavy, Rowland's Out of Jail, Heading to Indiana, DESERET 
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 30,2004. 
94. See id. 
95. See Katha Pollitt, Pregnant and Dangerous, 278 (#16) M NATION 9, Apr. 26,2004. 
96. See id.; see also Pamela Manson, Mother is Charged in Stillborn Son's Death . . ., SALT 
LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 12,2004, at Al .  
97. Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96. Prosecutors charged 
that she refused to have a Caesarean section because of cosmetic concerns that the operation would 
disfigure her. See id But Rowland stated that she never would have said that because she had 
already delivered two children by Caesarean. See Pollitt, supra note 95. 
98. See, e.g., Thompson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96. 
99. See Manson, supra note 96. 
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pleaded guilty to two counts of felony child endangerment based on her 
drug use during pregnancy pursuant to a plea bargain. 100 
The Rowland case aroused a storm of contro~ersy.'~' Prosecutors 
argued that Rowland's failure to undergo a C-section when she was 
warned that the fetuses might be harmed by a delay in their birth was a 
culpable omission, demonstrating the "depraved indifference to human 
life" necessary for a murder charge.lo2 The indictment was expressly 
predicated on a theory of maternal "selfishness," as prosecutors argued 
that Ms. Rowland had refused the surgical procedure solely out of van- 
ity.'03 The prosecutors suggested, contrary to established tort law princi- 
ples of informed consent,lo4 that Ms. Rowland did not have a right to 
decline medical treatment, but was required to "choose among alternative 
treatments available," rather than electing the option of no treatment. lo5 
Virtually all other observers condemned the prosecution as unwar- 
ranted and legally unsound.lo6 In part, they argued that it was improper 
and dangerous to subject anyone to the risk of criminal prosecution based 
on a decision to forego a potentially dangerous surgical procedure, par- 
ticularly when there had been no effort to seek a court order mandating 
medical treatment.lo7 Commentators also asserted that criminal prosecu- 
tion was not the way to handle potentially risky pregnancies, as it would 
drive vulnerable women away from medical treatment due to fear that 
they would face criminal charges if they admitted to having a drug or 
mental health problem.lo8 Similarly, vulnerable women may fear crimi- 
nal charges if they underwent drug testing while receiving prenatal care 
or delivering the baby.lo9 Further, some writers cautioned that prosecut- 
ing pregnant women under these circumstances would lead to a slippery 
100. See Santini, supra note 25; see also Doug Smith & Linda Thomson, Rowland in New 
Trouble, DESERET MORNING NEWS May 27, 2004. Ms. Rowland was sentenced to two concurrent 
five year prison terms, with sentence suspended while on "good behavior" probation for eighteen 
months, requiring her to complete mental health and substance abuse treatment as well as a "parent- 
ing skills" course. See id. Ms. Rowland went directly from jail to a rehabilitation facility in Indiana, 
but left it after a month. See id. 
101. See Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93. 
102. Thomson, Rowland Case Is Called 'Political,' DESERET MORNING NEWS Mar. 13,2004. 
103. Associated Press, Mother Accused of Murder of Unborn Child Pleads Not Guilty, Mar. 
15, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/natiod20040315-1529-wst-mother 
charged.htm1. 
104. See discussion infa in Part 11. Utah Code Ann. 5 78-14-5 codifies the common law of 
informed consent, although it presumes that "when a person submits to health care rendered by a 
health care provider . . . that what the health care provider did was [ ]expressly or impliedly author- 
ized" by the patient. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(1) (2006). However, patients may still have a 
cause of action for battery without meeting the requirements of 5 78-14-5 if they allege that they did 
not consent at all to medical treatment. Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
105. Linda Thomson, Mother Is Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET MORNMG NEWS 
(Salt Lake City, Utah), Mar. 12,2004. 
106. See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; Matt Canham, Proposed Law Targets Preg- 
nant Drug Users . . . , SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Apr. 10,2004, at Al. 
107. See Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96. 
108. See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Canham, supra note 106. 
109. See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Canham, supra note 106. 
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slope: there was no principled way to distinguish the prosecution in that 
case fi-om prosecution of pregnant women who smoke or who do not 
follow their physicians' recommendations about healthy eating.''' Fi- 
nally, observers again noted the problem of selective prosecution, since 
almost all those facing such criminal charges are poor and women of 
color. ' ' ' 
Nonetheless, prosecutors continue to bring criminal charges against 
women who have used drugs while pregnant, most recently in Mary- 
land,''* ~ i s s o u r i , " ~  Texas,'I4 and Wy~ming."~ It appears that prosecu- 
tors are more interested in scoring points with the public or in pushing 
the legislature to expand criminal sanctions against pregnant women who 
use drugs than in addressing the underlying causes of substance abuse. 
For example, a Wyoming prosecutor who lost his case declared, "We 
110. Associated Press, Arrest in C-Section Case Alarms Women S Groups, THE HOLLAND 
SENTINEL, available at http:NhollandsentineI.com (use search function and type in name of article). 
11 1. See, e.g., Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, supra note 9, at 938; Chasnoff et al., 
supra note 10, at 1206. 
112. See general& Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006). The Maryland Court of Ap- 
peals has recently invalidated the prosecution of two women for reckless endangerment based on 
their use of cocaine while pregnant. Id. 
113. A Missouri prosecutor charged Keila Lewis with first degree felony child endangerment, 
based on her newborn baby's positive test for marijuana and Lewis' admission that she smoked 
marijuana once while pregnant. Brief of Amici Curiae in State v. Lewis, Case 03CR113048, Chari- 
ton County, Missouri Circuit Ct. (on file with author) Ms. Lewis was charged with violating section 
568.045, which provides inter alia that "A person commits the crime of endangering the welfare of a 
child in the first degree i f .  . . [tlhe person knowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk 
to the life, body, or health of a child less than seventeen years old. . . ." MO. ANN. STAT. 5 568.045 
(West 2006). The case was dismissed in 2005 because the infant's toxicology test was inadmissible 
under Missouri law. Personal communications with Jane Aiken, Professor, Washington University 
School of Law, March 7,2005, and Jenean Thompson, Counsel for Keila Lewis, June 21,2005. 
114. In September 2003, an Amarillo, Texas prosecutor invoked a newly enacted state law 
when she asked local physicians to report all women who used illegal drugs while pregnant, so that 
they could be prosecuted for child abuse. The new law, redefined the term "individual" in certain 
statutes to mean "a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at very stage of gestation 
from fertilization until birth." S. 319, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). The law also redefined 
death to "include ... for an individual who is an unborn child, the failure to be born alive." Tex. 
Atty. Gen. Opinion No. GA-0291, January 5, 2005, available at http:// 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/GA/GAO29l.pdf. See Letter from Rebecca King, 47' District 
Attorney to all Physicians Practicing in Potter County, Texas (Sept. 22, 2003) (on file with author). 
The prosecutor charged at least eighteen women with crimes before the Texas Attorney General 
issued an Opinion concluding that the new law neither authorized prosecution for maternal drug use 
under the Controlled Substances Act nor required physicians to report such drug use. News from 
Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women, 
http://realcostofprisons.org/blog. The convictions of two women for delivery of a controlled sub- 
stance to a fetus were overturned by the Texas Court of Appeals, on the ground that the prosecution 
did not show that the fetus possessed the drug as required by Texas law. Ward v. State, 188 S.W.3d 
874 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) and Rhonda Tulane Smith v. State, No. 07-04-0490, 2006 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 2370 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29,2006) (unpublished opinion). 
115. See Associated Press, Judge Drops 'Merh Baby' Charge, CASPER STAR-TRLBuNE, Sept. 
29, 2005, available at http:Nwww.casperstartribune.com (use search function). In 2004, a Wyoming 
prosecutor charged Michelle Foust with causing a child to ingest methamphetamine based on blood 
tests of Foust and her newborn child. See id. The case was dismissed on the ground that the law 
encompassed conduct taken in regard to a "'child,' ... not a 'fetus' or 'unborn child."' Id.; see also 
Associated Press, Woman Charged with Using Meth While Pregnant Arrested Again, May 2, 2005, 
available at http://www.billingsgazette.com (use search function). 
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stuck our toe in the water on this thing . . . . People need to understand 
there's a big hole in the law that needs to be filled." It has been left to 
the judiciary to restrain overzealous prosecutors, through the application 
of the hndamental principle that legislative intent to criminalize certain 
behavior must be clear, and in recognition of the multiple policy consid- 
erations that argue against punishing pregnant women rather than offer- 
ing them treatment. '" 
B. New Criminal Statutes: Changing the Born-Alive Rule 
While the prosecutions of pregnant women for murder in McKnight 
and Rowland made headlines, the trend toward third party criminal liabil- 
ity for causing the death of a fetus has been underway for more than 
thirty years."* This change has been accomplished primarily by legisla- 
tive action, as courts have been reluctant to overturn the common law 
"born-alive rule" without explicit legislative authorization. Under the 
"born-alive rule," the fetus was not seen as a legal person, separate from 
its mother, and a homicide prosecution could not be br~ught. ' '~ Criminal 
1 16. Associated Press, Judge Drops 'Meth Baby' Charge, supra note 1 15. 
117. See Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006). As the Maryland Court of Appeals ex- 
plained in State v. Kilmon, to accept the prosecutor's argument to construe the reckless endanger- 
ment statute to apply to pregnant women who used drugs could mean the criminalization of: 
m o t  just the ingestion of unlawful controlled substances but a whole host of intentional 
and conceivably reckless activity . . . [including] everything from becoming (or remain- 
ing) pregnant with knowledge that the child likely will have a genetic disorder that may 
cause serious disability or death . . . to smoking, to not maintaining a proper and suffi- 
cient diet . . . to exercising too much or too little . . . . 
Id. at 31 1-12. The court also noted that the Maryland Legislature had considered but a penal ap- 
proach to pregnant women's drug use, choosing instead to provide drug treatment for pregnant 
women and to consider a woman's drug use while pregnant, if she subsequently refused to enter a 
treatment program, as evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights. Id. at 3 12. 
1 18. Seegenerally Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
119. See, e.g., id. The "born alive" rule is of very long standing. See id. Lord Coke is fre- 
quently cited for his articulation of the rule: 
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe, or 
if a man beat her, whereby the child dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead 
childe, this is great misprision, and no murder; but if he childe be born alive and dyeth of 
the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable 
creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive. 
State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 601 (Ohio 1971) (citing 3 Coke, Institutes 58 [1648]). Coke 
was followed by other British jurists, including Blackstone, Hale, Hawkins, and Sir James Stephen, 
and the rule passed into American common law. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 620. 
120. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moms, 142 S.W. 3d 654, 657 (Ky. 2004). In part this was 
due to difficulties in proof, because in the case of a stillbirth it could not be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the fetus had been alive when injured or that the defendant's conduct was the 
proximate cause of death. See id. (citing Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The 
Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. L. REV. 563, 575 (1987)). At the same 
time, the born alive rule reflected the essential unity of the pregnant woman and her fetus, and the 
latter's absolute dependence on her for existence. C .  Dobson v. Dobson, [I9991 2 S.C.R. 753, lq 
95-96 (Can.) (explaining, in the context of deciding not to impose maternal tort liability on the basis 
of prenatal harm, that "a pregnant woman cannot have a duty of care to her own foetus, which is at 
law but a part of herself. . . . [Tlhe physical unity of pregnant woman and foetus means that the 
imposition of a duty of care would amount to a profound compromise of her privacy and auton- 
omy."). 
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statutes were interpreted in light of that rule, unless the statute specifi- 
cally included fetuses within the class of victirns.12' 
In the last few years, there has been an expanded push to character- 
ize the harm caused by battering a pregnant woman solely as harm to the 
fetus, effectively erasing the woman her~e1f . I~~ New criminal laws di- 
rected at fetal harm ignore the psychic injuries imposed on the woman by 
such attacks. These include the fear of future domestic violence and 
subjugation by an intimate partner, the loss of self-determination, and the 
harm to the woman's interest in carrying her pregnancy to term.123 At 
least nineteen states have enacted statutes authorizing a homicide prose- 
cution for causing the death of a fetus,'24 and Congress accomplished 
this via the Unborn Victims of Violence Act.12' Several states have en- 
acted separate feticide statutes or other statutes focusing on fetal harm.126 
Some state courts have achieved the same result through judicial inter- 
pretation, rejecting the common law "born alive" rule as ~utmoded.'~' 
However, with the exception of South Carolina, each court has been 
121. See, e.g., Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d at 600-02. The same approach was taken with tort suits 
for prenatal injury and wrongful death, and inheritance proceedings. See id. (citing Robbins v. State, 
8 Ohio St. 131 (1857)); see also Keeler, 470 P.2d at 627 (citing State v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (Pa. 
1797)); see also Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. 1951) (citing Black- 
stone's Commentary on the Laws of England and the common law rule that an infant "in the 
mother's womb . . . is capable of having a legacy . . . made to it."). See generally Remy v. Mac- 
Donald, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004) (discussing common law cases permitting a born child to sue 
a third party for causing prenatal injuries and the Massachusetts wrongful death statute's applicabil- 
ity to a viable stillborn fetus). 
122. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND. 
L. J. 667,694-97 (2006). 
123. Id. at 669,677-85. 
124. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. 6 13-1 103(A)(5) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE 6 187(a) (West 2006); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. $5 782.071, 782.09 (West 2006); 720 LLL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 519-1.2, 519-2.1,5/9- 
3.2 (West 2006); M m .  STAT. ANN. $6 609.266, 609.2661-65 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. 6 97- 
3-37 (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. $6 1.205,565.024,565.020 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
6 200.210 (West 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW 6 125.00 (McKinney 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE 6612.1-01- 
04, 17.1-01-04 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $6 2903.01-2903.07, 2903.09 (West 2006); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 2601-09 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS $6 22-16-1, 22-16-15, 22-16-20, 
22-16-41 (2006) (including definitions: 22-1-2(3 I), 22-1-(50A)); TENN. CODE ANN. $6 39-1 3-201, 
39-13-202, 39-13-210 (amended 2006), 39-13-21 1, 39-13-213 to 215 (West 2006); UTAH CODE 
ANN. 6 76-5-201 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. 6 18.2-31 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 6 
9A.32.060(1)(b) (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. $6 939.75, 940.01-.02, 940.05-.06, 940.08-.10 
(West 2006). 
125. Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004). 
126. GA. CODE ANN. $6 16-5-80, 40-6-393.1, 52-7-12.3 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. 6 35- 
42-1-6 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. 6 707.8 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. 6 21-3440 (West 
2006); H. 108, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $6 14:32.5-32.8 
(2006) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. $6 63 1 : 1-63 1 :2 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. 6 30-3-7 (West 2006); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 6 14-18.2 (West 2006). In Virginia, killing a pregnant woman with the intent 
to terminate her pregnancy is capital murder. VA. CODE ANN. 6 18.2-3 1 (West 2006). 
127. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moms, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004) (holding that born alive 
rule should be eliminated through a reinterpretation of the term "human being"); Hughes v. State, 
868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (holding in a vehicular manslaughter case that born alive rule 
should be abandoned, but only prospectively); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27 
(Mass. 1984) (holding that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the vehicular homicide 
statute, but applying it prospectively only "in order to ensure fairness to the defendant and . . . 
[others] who did not have the benefit of the warning provided by our construction"). 
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careful to apply its rule prospectively only, recognizing the due process 
"legality" problem that would arise if a court were to change the com- 
mon law and apply it to the case before it.I2' 
C. Regulatory Redefinition: SCHIP-Turning the Fetus into a Child 
At the same time that criminal initiatives which treat the fetus as a 
legally separate person have increased, the Bush Administration has 
adopted regulatory policies with the same goal. In 2002, the Department 
of Health and Services (HHS) promulgated a regulation purporting to 
"clarify and expand"'29 the definition of "child" under the State Child 
Health Insurance ~ r o ~ r a m ' ~ '  by redefining "child from "an individual 
under 19 years of age"I3' to "an individual under the age of 19 including 
the period from conception to birth."'32 The Bush Administration offered 
two justifications for this change. The first was to promote the birth of 
healthy children by expanding government coverage of prenatal care, 
fetal surgery, and other medical interventions which it asserted would 
provide "continuity of care," benefit children after birth, and ultimately 
save the SCHIP program money.'33 The second goal was to maximize 
states' "regulatory fle~ibil i ty," '~~ permitting them to cover "unborn chil- 
dren," including those of immigrant women, who would otherwise be 
excluded from federal health care programs under the provisions of the 
128. See, e.g., Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 654; see also Hughes, 868 P.2d at 730; see also Cass, 
467 N.E.2d at 1326-27. 
129. State Children's Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care for Unbom 
Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 9936,9937 (proposed Mar. 5,2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 457) [here- 
inafter SCHIP Proposed Rule]. 
130. The State Children's Health Insurance Program, or SCHIP, as it is popularly known, is a 
joint federal state program which, for ten years beginning in 1997, provides coverage for many poor 
children whose parents earn too much money to qualify for Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. 44 1397aa-jj. 
SCHIP is authorized under Title XXI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1397aa-jj. Many applaud 
SCHIP because it gives as an expansion of health care services for poor children and does so by 
providing states with 70% of its costs. See HHS News, States May Provide SCHIP Coverage for 
Prenatal Care, New Rule to Expand Health Care Coverage for Babies, Mothers, Sept. 27, 2002, 
available at www.hhs.gov/news [hereinafter HHS News]. However, SCHLP is also frequently 
criticized as providing a much more meager package of health benefits than Medicaid, particularly 
those comprehensive Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSTD) benefits that 
are especially important for children with disabilities. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, 
supra note 29, at 1, 3-12. Medicaid and SCHIP are both faulted, for having administrative barriers 
that make it difficult for enrollees to maintain eligibility. See id. at 10; Wendy Chavkin & Paul H. 
Wise, The Data Are In: Health Matters in Welfare Policy, 92 AM J .  PUB. HEALTH 1392, 1393-94 
(2002). 
131. Section 21 10 of SCHIP; 42 U.S.C. 1397jj(c)(l) (2006) (defining "child as "an individual 
under 19 years of age"). 
132. State Children's Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care and Other Health 
Services for Unbom Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 61956 (Oct. 2,2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 457) 
(discussing the procedural history of the regulation, which was subsequently codified at 42 C.F.R. 4 
457.10) [hereinafter SCHIP Final Rule]. 
133. SCHIP Proposed Rule, supra note 129, at 9937. 
134. This "state choice" mantra was evident throughout the Federal Register notice promulgat- 
ing the final regulations, with the Department of Health and Services reiterating its view "that States 
should have the option to include unborn children as eligible targeted low income children. We are 
therefore retaining a revised definition [of child] . . . that permits States maximum flexibility in 
extending SCHIP eligibility." SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61960. 
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (PRWORA). 13' 
Critics of the proposed regulation responded with several argu- 
ments. First, the most fundamental objection to the new SCHIP regula- 
tions was that they constituted an ultra vires action by HHS, since noth- 
ing in the SCHIP statute or its legislative history suggested that Congress 
intended "child" to have anything other than its common, everyday 
meaning, as one who had been born. Critics noted that Congress knew 
how to use the term "unborn child," as it had in the Medicare and Medi- 
caid statutes, and that all the services covered under SCHIP, such as 
"well-baby and well-child care," were manifestly applicable only to born 
~h i1d ren . l~~  Critics asserted that Congressional silence about "unborn 
children" in enacting SCHIP meant that Congress had not intended them 
to be covered by the SCHIP program.137 HHS responded that the silence 
meant only that Congress had not "directly spoke[n] to . . . whether the 
term 'child' could include unborn children."138 
Second, critics noted that when the regulations were proposed, a bi- 
partisan coalition in Congress was already working to amend SCHIP to 
provide prenatal and postpartum care to pregnant women. The critics 
asserted that the regulatory change to include "unborn children" was 
unnecessary if in truth HHS' goal was simply to provide the needed 
care. 139 
Third, many objected to the regulation's blatant politicization of 
maternal and children's health.140 By adopting a definition of "child 
which was not in the statute and was inconsistent with long-standing 
Supreme Court precedent that a fetus was not a child,14' the HHS regula- 
135. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 
104-193 (codified at 42 U.S.C. $5 601-19). 
136. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61961-62. 
137. See id. at 61962. 
138. Id. 
139. Cynthia Dailard, New SCHIP Prenatal Care Rule Advances Fetal Rights At Low-Income 
Women's Expense, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, Dec. 2002, at 3. Among the 
bills pending were the Mothers and Newborns Health Insurance Act of 2001, S. 724, 107th Cong. 
(2002); the Start HealthyIStay Healthy Act of 2001, S. 1016, 107th Cong. (2001) and the Start 
HealthyIStay Healthy Act of 2001, H.R. 3729, 107th Cong. (2002); the Immigrant Children's Health 
Improvement Act of 2001, S. 582, 107th Cong. (2001) and the Legal Immigrant Children's Health 
Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1143, 107th Cong. (2001), all of which proposed to amend Medi- 
caid and SCHIP to pennit states to offer health care to more infants and pregnant women, including 
immigrant women who were excluded from eligibility under the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,42 U.S.C. $§601 et seq. 
140. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61957; Editorial, A Cynical Political Act, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at B06; AMERICAN CNIL LIBERTIES UNION, COMMENTS ON STATE CHILDREN'S 
HEALTH PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY FOR PRENATAL CARE FOR UNBORN CHILDREN, May 6, 2002, 
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiveri&ts/fetaIrights/l64001eg20020506.html [hereinafter ACLU 
COMMENTS]; Dailard, supra note 139, at 5. 
141. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the fetus was not a person within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). In Burns v. Alcala, the Court held, in a case 
challenging the denial of welfare benefits to pregnant women under the Aid to Families with De- 
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tions were part of a strategy to undermine access to ab0rti0n.l~~ It surely 
was not coincidental that HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson announced 
the new regulations at the Conservative Political Action Committee Con- 
ference, touting the Bush Administration's "commitment to the un- 
born." 143 
Fourth, critics charged that the regulations violated the First 
Amendment in imposing a particular theological viewpoint on the 
American public, i.e., that life begins at conception.'44 The critics as- 
serted that poor pregnant women who did not believe that a fetus was a 
child would be forced to choose between acting in conformity with their 
beliefs and accepting a government benefit enshrining a different reli- 
gious belief, and that this violated the Supreme Court's Free Exercise of 
Religion cases.145 HHS rejected this concern, stating that "[ilf a woman 
has a religious objection, she simply would not accept SCHIP bene- 
f i t ~ , " ' ~ ~  ignoring the reality that many poor women need these health 
care services. 
Fifth, critics contended that the regulation was bad health policy, as 
it provided continuity of care for the fetus but not for the woman, who 
would not be entitled to post-partum care because it was her "child," and 
not she, who was the patient under SCHIP.14' Not only did this devalue 
women by treating them as mere "vessels" for the fetus, but the regula- 
pendent Children (AFDC) program, that pregnant women were not entitled to receive AFDC bene- 
fits because "dependent child" does not include an unborn child. 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975). The 
B u m  court stated: 
Following the axiom that words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning 
in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary . . . and reading the definition "de- 
pendent child" in its statutory context, we conclude that Congress used the word "child" 
to refer to an individual already born, with an existence separate from its mother. 
Id. at 580-8 1. 
142. See Elisabeth H. Sperow, Redejning Child Under the State Children's Health Insurance 
Program: Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Results, 12 AM. U .  J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 137, 
143-44 (2003). 
143. Id. at 156-57 (citing Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y Health & Human Servs., Compassion- 
ate Conservatism and Health Care Policy, Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Committee 
Conference (Jan. 3 1,2002) (transcript available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech~2002). 
144. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61963. 
145. Id. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a state could 
not deny unemployment insurance benefits to a person fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath 
without running afoul of the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Id. at 410. 
This ruling has been undercut to some extent by the Court's decision in Employment Div. of Oregon 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 890, which held that Oregon could deny unemployment benefits on 
the ground of work-related misconduct, when Smith, a drug counselor, used peyote (a controlled 
substance whose use was prohibited by Oregon criminal law) during a Native American Church 
ceremony. 
146. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61963. However, in Sherbert, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that the exercise of religious freedom could not be predicated on a rightlprivilege dis- 
tinction. 374 U.S. at 404-05 (citing American Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950); 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)). 
147. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61960, 61967-70. Further, as  HHS conceded, 
although covering the "unborn child" meant continuity of coverage after birth, this did not change 
the state's normal "redetermination of eligibility" period, which could, depending on state rules, fall 
shortly after the child was born. See id. at 61964. 
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tion was also contrary to accepted medical practice and counter- 
productive for the newly born child, who depended on care from a 
healthy mother.14* These critics noted that a wide range of medical con- 
ditions could affect the mother without directly affecting her fetus or 
newborn,'49 and that these might not be covered under the HHS regula- 
tion.150 HHS conceded the point, declaring that "care after delivery, such 
as postpartum services could not be covered as part of the Title XXI 
[SCHIP] State Plan, . . . because they are not services for an eligible 
~hild."'~' Further, HHS informed state SCHIP administrators that states 
could cover "at least one postnatal visit" only if they used a "bundled fee 
payment" or "global fee method" in paying for pregnancy and delivery 
services. '52 Since only twenty-eight states use this billing method, there 
was concern that many new mothers would have serious gaps in their 
health care.'53 There were also fears that some health care providers 
would choose not to treat pregnant women under SCHIP at all, to avoid 
the ethical and malpractice issues raised by having the fetus, and not the 
woman, as their patient. '54 
The sixth concern was that the SCHIP change would not deliver 
more care to pregnant immigrant women.'55 Commentators asserted that 
because the new regulation did not exempt the states from their reporting 
obligations to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, many immi- 
grant women would still be afraid to request services.'56 
148. Id. at 61968-70; see also Impact on Infant and Maternal Mortality: Hearings on Unin- 
sured Pregnant Women Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 107th Cong. 
747 (2002) (statement of Senator Jeff Bingaman) ; see also ACLU COMMENTS, supra note 140. 
149. These included "breast masses, influenza . . . vaccination, . . . peptic ulcer disease, . . . 
postpartum treatment of hemorrhage, infection, episiotomy repair, and postpartum depression." 
MARCH OF DIMES COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE TO REDEFINE CHILD UNDER SCHIP, May 6, 
2002, http://www.marchofdimes.com (use search function). 
150. See, e.g., id. 
151. SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61969. 
152. Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Dir., Center for Medicaid and State Operations of Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to State Health Officials (Nov. 12,2002) (on file with author). 
153. Dailard, supra note 139, at 5. 
154. Id. at 4. 
155. HHS asserted that "the new regulation makes sure that all low-income immigrants have 
access to important prenatal care for their babies." HHS News, supra note 130. 
156. Dailard, supra note 139, at 5; SCHtP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61965-66. Many 
immigrants continue to be deterred from seeking government supported health care for which they 
andor their children are eligible, due to confusion about eligibility requirements and fear that health 
care providers or government insurance programs will report illegal immigrants to the federal en- 
forcement authorities. See URBAN INSTITUTE, IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND WORKERS, THE HEALTH 
AND WELL-BEING OF YOUNG CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS, Brief No. 5, Feb. 2005, at 3, available at 
http://www.urban.org/publications/310584.html; KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, IMMIGRANTS' HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND ACCESS, Aug. 2003, at 2, available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/l-index.cfm; NATIONAL lMMlGRAnON LAW CENTER, 
IMMIGRATION-FRIENDLY HEALTH COVERAGE OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT, June 2002, at 1, 
available at h t t p : / / w w w . n i l c . o r g / i ~ p b s / h e a l t M s s u e ~ B r i e f s ~ ~ t - F r i ~ d l y ~ A p p ~ E m l l m t .  
PDF. Indeed, some legal immigrants are denied care; see also Julia Preston, Tam Hospitals' Sepa- 
rate Paths Reflect the Debate on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at Al ,  A18. When the 
SCHIP rule was proposed, and the final rule promulgated, enforcement authority was held in the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. On November 25,2002 President Bush signed the Home- 
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Finally, critics argued that justifying the regulation as a means of 
expanding health care access15' was disingenuous and contrary to the 
fiscal structure of SCHIP. Because the regulation did not (and could not) 
authorize additional funding for SCHIP, it could not lead to any more 
health care being delivered.I5* Further, because SCHIP is optional both 
with regard to states' decision to participate and the range of services 
they offer,159 states had no incentive to add "unborn children" to their 
programs. In practice, these predictions have been fulfilled. Only nine 
states decided to cover "unborn children" under SCHIP,160 and one of 
these-Rhode Island-had already included pregnant women under an 
HHS-approved waiver.I6' Because total SCHIP funds are capped, and 
many states are struggling to handle mounting Medicaid and SCHIP 
costs in a time of budget  shortfall^,'^^ they are unlikely to expand SCHIP 
163 programs. Indeed, many states have been cutting or redesigning 
SCHIP to limit costs. 
D. Compelled Medical Treatment, Civil Commitment, and Fetal Guardi- 
unships 
In recent years, other efforts to "protect" fetuses from their mothers' 
actions during pregnancy have increa~ed , '~~  limiting women's autonomy 
to make medical decisions for themselves. Two-thirds of states either 
preclude or limit the enforcement of a woman's previously expressed 
wishes about foregoing medical treatment from being implemented while 
she is pregnant.165 In addition, many states authorize the civil commit- 
land Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, which transfered immigration 
enforcement authority to the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, within the Depart- 
ment of Homeland Security. 
157. HHS News, supra note 130. 
158. ACLU COMMENTS, supra note 140; see also KAISER COMMISSION O MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, ASSESSING THE ROLE OF RECENT WAIVERS IN PROVIDING NEW COVERAGE, Dec. 2003, 
at iii, available at http:Nwww.kff.orglmedicaid/4158.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, ASSESSING WAIVERS] 
(noting that SCHIP funds are capped nationally, and that "[nlot all states have available funds to 
redirect toward coverage"). 
159. Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 1, 17-2 1. 
160. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED: 
STATE CHOICES INFLUENCE HEALTH COVERAGE ACCESS FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, OC~. 2005, 
at 19, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7393.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, IN A TIME OF 
GROWING NEED]. 
161. HHS News, supra note 130 (noting that Rhode Island, Colorado and New Jersey had 
previously obtained waivers to include pregnant women in their SCHIP programs). 
162. KAISER, ASSESSING WAIVERS, supra note 158, at iv (observing that Medicaid and SCHIP 
enrollment grew by about 3.2 million people in 2002, largely "because more people became eligible 
for Medicaid due to the downturn in the economy"). 
163. Many states have cut or redesigned their SCHIP programs to limit costs. JOHN HOLAHAN 
ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO 2004 BUDGET CRISES: A LOOK AT TEN STATES, URBAN INSTITUTE, 
Feb. 2004, at 1-2,7-8, available at http:Nwww.urban.orgAJploadedPDF/ 
410946-StateBudgetCrises.pdf; IAN HILL, HOLLY STOCKDALE & BRIGETTE COURTOT, SQUEEZING 
SCHIP: STATES USE FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO THE ONGOING BUDGET CRISIS, URBAN 
INSTITUTE, June 2004, at 1-2, available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?lD=3 1 1015. 
164. See generally Jerdee, supra note 4. 
165. See generally id. 
Heinonline - -  84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 5 6 3  2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7  
5 64 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIE W p o l .  84:2 
ment of pregnant women for substance abuse treatment,'66 as well as 
court orders that compel women to accept medical attendants at labor 
and delivery, or mandate particular forms of care such as Caesarean sec- 
tions. 
1. The Pregnancy Exception from Advanced Medical Directives 
Women have regularly been denied the right to self-determination 
and bodily integrity by state laws that, in the name of "fetal protection," 
automatically invalidate advance health care directives when a woman is 
pregnant. Advance directives are widely seen as an important and bind- 
ing vehicle that enable competent individuals to indicate the kinds of 
health care treatment they want should they become terminally ill, suffer 
a stroke or other neurological injury, or are in a persistent vegetative 
state, and, due to mental incapacity, can no longer make treatment deci- 
s i o n ~ . ' ~ ~  Advance directives are particularly important for women, be- 
cause of judicial gender bias in many cases in which men, but not 
women, have been deemed strong, self-reliant, and courageous enough to 
choose death rather than a lifetime spent in a persistent vegetative state 
or other mentally compromised c0nditi0n.l~~ 
Yet two-thirds of states either limit absolutely or make it more diffi- 
cult to enforce women's advance directives when they become pregnant. 
Seventeen states provide statutory exceptions to their "living will" or 
health care proxy statutes which render advance directions automatically 
ineffective if the patient is pregnant. '69 Another sixteen states render the 
living will or health care proxy inapplicable in a variety of circum- 
stances, ranging from a possibility to a probability that the fetus will 
"develop to a live birth."'70 Minnesota gives a slight bow to women's 
autonomy by establishing a rebuttable presumption that a pregnant 
woman would want health care to be provided if there is a "real possibil- 
ity [that] . . . the fetus could survive to the point of life birth," even if 
"the withholding or withdrawal of such health care would be authorized 
were she not pregnant."'7' The presumption can be rebutted by an ex- 
166. See, e.g., Wls. STAT. §§ 48.205 (2006) (permitting the civil commitment of pregnant girls 
and women, dubbed "The Cocaine Mom law"); see also Tom Kertscher, 'Cocaine Mom ' Law In- 
voked in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without 
Other Crime, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Nov. 5,1999, at 1 .  
167. See Linda C.  Fentiman, Privacy and Personhood Revisited: Substitute Decisionmaking for 
the Incompetent Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 818-828 (1989) (discussing living 
wills and documents designating a medical treatment agent); see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 
supra note 29, at 842. 
168. See generally Steven H .  Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender, and "The Right to 
Die," 18 L. MED. &HEALTH CARE 85 (1990). 
169. Jerdee, supra note 4, at 978 n.35. 
170. Id. at 978-79 1111.36-44. The Alaska statute cited in n.37, ALASKA STAT 3 18.12.040, was 
repealed in 2004. 
17 1 .  The Minnesota law states in pertinent part: 
When a patient lacks decision-making capacity and is pregnant, and in reasonable Medi- 
cal judgment there is a real possibility that if health care to sustain her life and the life of 
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plicit statement to the contrary in the advance directive itself, or by clear 
and convincing evidence presented at a hearing.'72 While Minnesota's 
law endeavors to strike a balance between the woman's interest in auton- 
omy and the provision of a living maternal body in which the fetus can 
continue to develop, it still enshrines a normative view of women-that 
any "reasonable" woman would choose to continue on life-support if it 
meant that her fetus would survive until birth. 
The potential impact of these statutes is substantial. In University 
Health Services v. ~ i a z z i , ' ~ ~  a Georgia trial court granted a hospital's 
petition to continue life support for a brain-dead pregnant woman over 
the objections of the woman's husband and other family members,'74 SO 
that a fetus could be delivered. Although Ms. Piazzi had not executed an 
advance directive, the court reached out to decide the case based on the 
Georgia Natural Death Act, which rendered a pregnant woman's advance 
directive inoperable if the fetus was viable.17' The court declared that 
because Ms. Piazzi was brain dead, she no longer had a constitutionally 
protected right to privacy,'76 but implied that even if she did, any inter- 
est she had would be rendered irrelevant by the Georgia living will stat- 
ute. '77 
In contrast to the Piazzi court's expansive interpretation, two other 
courts have rebuffed constitutional challenges to state advance directive 
statutes, dismissing the cases for lack of justiciability. In DiNino v. 
 ort ton,'^^ a woman alleged that the Washington Model Health Care 
Directive Act was unconstitutional because it made advance directives 
ineffective during pregnancy.'79 DiNino drafted an advance directive 
contrary to Washington law, and her physician refused to place it in her 
medical file, asserting fears of potential liability.l8' DeNino sought a 
declaratory judgment that her advance directive was valid and enforce- 
the fetus is provided the fetus could survive to the point of live birth, the health care pro- 
vider shall presume that the patient would have wanted such health care to be provided, 
even if the withholding or withdrawal of such health care would be authorized were she 
not pregnant. This presumption is negated by health care directive provisions described in 
section 145C.05, subdivision 2, paragraph (a), clause (lo), that are to the contrary, or, in 
the absence of such provisions, by clear and convincing evidence that the patient's 
wishes, while competent, were to the contrary. 
MINN. STAT. § 145C. 10 (g) (2006). 
172. Id. 
173. This unreported case, No. CV86-RCCV-464, was cited in Daniel Sperling, Maternal 
Brain Death, 30 AM. J .  L. & MED. 453, 494-95 (2004) and Molly C. Dyke, A Matter of Li$e and 
Death: Pregnancy Clauses in Living WiN Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REV. 867,871-72 (1990). 
174. Daniel Sperling, Panel Discussion American Association of Law Schools Panel: Panel on 
the Use of Patients for Teaching Purposes Without Their Knowledge or Consent: Article: Do Preg- 
nant Women Have (Living) Will?, 8 J .  HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 33 1,336 (2005). 
175. GA. CODE ANN. 5 31-32-3@) (2006). 
176. Sperling, supra note 173, at 336-37. 
177. Id. at 337. 
178. 684 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1984) (en banc). 
179. DiNino, 684 P.2d at 1299. 
180. Id. at 1298-99. 
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able, and that her physician would not be held liable if he acted in accor- 
dance with its provisions. In the alternative, she argued the statute vio- 
lated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy, which encompassed 
her right to seek abortion and to forego medical treatment.lgl Her suit 
was dismissed as presenting a "purely hypothetical and speculative con- 
t r ~ v e r s ~ . ' ' ~ ~ ~  In Gabrynowicz v. ~ e i t k a m ~ ,  lg3 the plaintiffs challenged 
the constitutionality of two North Dakota statutes which rendered a 
woman's advance directive inoperable while she was pregnant, and fur- 
ther mandated that pregnant women receive medical treatment to permit 
the "continuing development and live birth of the unborn child."lg4 
While the United States District Court for North Dakota acknowledged 
the statutes' potential constitutional problems, it ruled that because the 
plaintiff was neither pregnant nor in a terminal condition, her case was 
non-justiciable.lg5 What both DiNino and Gablynowicz overlook, of 
course, is that the entire point of a living will or advance directive statute 
is to permit competent adults to announce their wishes for treatment prior 
to becoming incapacitated, when they are able to think through their 
choices. Denying a woman the opportunity to bring a constitutional 
challenge while healthy and non-pregnant will mean, in practical terms, 
that she will never be able to challenge the law. 
2. Civil Commitment for Substance Abuse and Other Treatment 
Thuty-four states and the District of Columbia currently permit 
pregnant women to be civilly committed for alcohol and other drug 
abuse.186 Most of these state statutes address substance abuse in the 
same way that statutes authorize the civil commitment of the mentally ill 
when the mental illness poses danger to "self or  other^."'^' Three states' 
statutes specifically target pregnant women.lg8 For example, the Minne- 
sota statute requires physicians to report pregnant patients' use of alcohol 
and controlled substances during pregnancy and mandates toxicology 
181. Id. at 1299. 
182. Id. at 1300. 
183. 904 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. 1995). 
184. Gabtynowicz, 904 F .  Supp. at 1062. One of the statutes being challenged stated: 
Notwithstanding a declaration executed under this chapter, medical treatment must be 
provided to a pregnant patient with a terminal condition unless . . . such medical treat- 
ment will not maintain the patient in such a way as to permit the continuing development 
and live birth of the unborn child or will be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to 
the patient or will prolong severe pain that cannot be alleviated by medication. 
N. D. CENT. CODE 5 23-06.4-07(3) (repealed 2005) 
185. Gabrynowicz, 904 F .  Supp. at 1063-64. 
186. See supra note 37 and statutes cited therein. 
187. See, e.g., ~ O W A  CODE 8 125.81 (2005) (authorizing the immediate custody of a chronic 
substance abuser, defined in 5 125.2 (2005) as a person who "[h]abitually lacks self control as to the 
use of chemical substances to the extent that the person is likely to endanger the person's health, or 
to physically injure the person's self or others, if allowed to remain at liberty without treatment" and 
"[llacks sufficient judgment to make responsible decisions with respect to the person's hospitaliza- 
tion or treatment"). 
188. M m .  STAT. 5 626.5561-63 (2005); OKL. STAT. tit. 63 5 1-546.5 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS 5 34-20A-70 (2006). 
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testing of mothers and newborns shortly after delivery if there is reason 
to believe that a mother has used controlled  substance^.'^^ At least one 
other state, Wisconsin, has amended its child abuse law to permit the 
involuntary commitment of pregnant women who are abusing alcohol or 
controlled substances throughout pregnancy to the extent constitutionally 
permissible. 
The Wisconsin law, popularly dubbed the "Cocaine Mom Bill," was 
a reaction to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. 
Angela M W. v. Krui~ki. '~ '  When Angela M.W. was pregnant, her phy- 
sician reported her to child welfare authorities after she tested positive 
for drugs and failed to show up for an appointment.'92 The court held 
that Ms. M.W. could not be compelled to participate in in-patient drug 
treatment through a "child custody" proceeding, concluding that the leg- 
islature had not intended the term "child" in the child neglect statute to 
include children not yet born. lg3 
The Arkansas Supreme Court relied on Angela M W. in Arkansas 
Dep 't of Human Services v. ~ollier,'" a case which challenged a family 
court judge's authority to declare that the fetus of a pregnant woman who 
was using methamphetamines was a dependent-neglected child. lg5 Act- 
ing sua sponte, the trial judge ordered the "child" to be taken into cus- 
tody, by holding the woman at a county detention center until she went 
into labor. lg6 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the judge's actions 
exceeded her statutory authority. 19' 
In sharp contrast to these two decisions, in 2000 a Massachusetts 
family court judge ordered the involuntary medical treatment of Rebecca 
Corneau, a pregnant woman who rejected all medical care and was sus- 
pected of membership in a religious cult that denied children adequate 
nutrition and medical care.lg8 The court ordered Ms. Corneau to be 
taken to a prison hospital and compelled to submit to a medical examina- 
tion to determine her health, pregnancy status, and the anticipated birth 
date of her "unborn child," so that the court could determine what prena- 
189. MINN. STAT. 5 626.5561 (2005). 
190. WIS. STAT. § 48.01(1) (2006). 
191. 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997). 
192. State ex rel. Angela M W., 561 N.W.2d at 732-33. 
193. Id. at 737. 
194. 95 S.W.3d 772 (2003). 
195. Collier, 95 S.W.3d at 773. 
196. Id. at 773; see also Bennett v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 782, 785 (2003) (holding in a related 
civil contempt proceeding that the trial judge lacked authority to hold the pregnant woman in con- 
tempt of court once the judge terminated her parental rights in a different case). 
197. Collier, 95 S.W.3d at 781 (rejecting arguments that the term "child" in the child neglect 
statute should be construed to include a fetus even though other areas of Arkansas law authorized 
actions to be brought on behalf of a fetus). 
198. Dave Wedge & Edwin Molina, Experts: Ruling May Just Open Up Floodgates, BOSTON 
HERALD, Sept. 1,2000, at 4. 
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tal treatment should be ordered.'" Ms. Corneau did not appeal the 
judge's ruling and she was imprisoned until after her child's birth, when 
the child was declared neglected and Corneau's parental rights were ter- 
minated. 200 
3. Compelled Caesarean Sections 
Women continue to be forced to have Caesarean sections over their 
 objection^.^^' In Jefferson v. Grzfln Spaulding County ~ o s ~ i t a l , ~ ~ ~  the 
Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a trial judge's decision to order a 
woman who was close to her delivery date to undergo a Caesarean sec- 
tion, based on hospital physicians' concern that because the fetus was in 
a breech position, it was likely to die in The court rejected 
Ms. Jefferson's religious objections to the procedure, but before the order 
could be enforced, she gave birth to a healthy In the landmark 
case of In re A.c.,~'~ the District of Columbia Court of Appeals took a 
different view, declaring that pregnant women had the right to control 
their medical treatment, even when it could affect the health of the fe- 
tus.*O6 The court stated, "[s]urely, . . . a fetus cannot have rights in this 
respect superior to those of a person who has already been born."207 
In 1996, a Florida trial court held an ex parte hearing concerning 
Laura Pemberton, a pregnant woman who refused medical advice to de- 
liver by Caesarean section because it was feared that her previous cae- 
199. See Barbara F .  v. Bristol Div. of Juvenile Court, 735 N.E. 2d 357 (Mass. 2000) (discuss- 
ing the juvenile court's order in the course of rejecting a challenge to that court's decision brought 
by another pregnant woman, who asserted that the juvenile court's order had a chilling effect on her 
own conduct). See also Wedge & Molina, supra note 198, at 4; Dave Wedge, Appeal Cites Abortion 
Ruling in Bid to Free Pregnant Cultist, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 6, 2000, at 10; Michael Paulson, 
Fetus Dispute Brings Wider Issues to Fore, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2000, at B5; Miller, supra 
note 34, at 71-74. 
200. Miller, supra note 34, at 73-74 nn. 3 1 & 34. 
201. For illuminating analyses of the issues raised by these cases, see Nancy K. Rhoden, The 
Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951 
(1986); Roberts, Punishing Addicts Who Have Babies, supra note 9, at 964. Women of color have 
borne the brunt of these interventions. Id. at 939. 
202. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). 
203. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458. 
204. Id. at 459. See also Alicia Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine 
Court-Ordered Medical Procedures During Pregnancy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 927,940 (1994). 
205. 573 A.2d 1235 @.C. 1990). 
206. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252. 
207. Id. at 1244. The case arose out of tragic circumstances. In 1987, Angela Carder, a twenty- 
seven year old woman who had survived cancer as a teenager, became pregnant. At twenty-five 
weeks of pregnancy, she was found to be suffering from cancer again. Id. Her condition deteriorated 
rapidly, and at twenty-six weeks, she was hospitalized and expected to die shortly. When the hospi- 
tal sought a court order to perform a Caesarean section, a trial court held a hearing, and ordered a 
Caesarean section to be performed. The baby died within two hours, and Carder died two days later. 
Id. at 1238. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeal declared first that the pregnant 
woman had the right to self-determination, which included the right to refuse a Caesarean section. 
The court further held that in cases such as this one, where it was difficult to ascertain the pregnant 
woman's wishes because she was close to death, under the influence of medication, and suffering 
extreme emotional distress, the trial court should undertake a substituted judgment analysis, so that it 
could decide what the patient would have chosen if she were competent. Id. at 1247-49. 
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sarean section put her at higher risk for uterine rupture.208 The court 
ordered Ms. Pemberton to be transported to the hospital via ambulance 
against her will, and then continued the hearing in her presence, ulti- 
mately ordering the Caesarean section to be performed.209 When Ms. 
Pemberton subsequently brought a section 1983 civil rights action an 
action in federal court, the court held that Ms. Pemberton's constitutional 
rights "did not outweigh Florida's interest in preserving the life of the 
unborn ~hild."~" 
In a less dramatic case, in 2004 a Pennsylvania woman, Amber 
Marlowe, who had previously given birth to six children, each weighing 
more than eleven pounds, went to deliver her seventh child, only to be 
told that the fetus was so large that it was not safe to deliver ~ a ~ i n a l l ~ . ~ l I  
When Marlowe declined the hospital's advice to have a Caesarean sec- 
tion, the hospital obtained an ex parte order compelling her to have the 
surgery.212 Marlowe and her husband did not learn of the order until 
after she had safely delivered her baby at another hospital.213 
These court-ordered detentions and medical interventions are con- 
trary to the prevailing view of medical professionals that medical treat- 
ment against the pregnant woman's wishes is rarely, if ever, appropri- 
ate.214 The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG), 
for example, emphasizes that medical judgment is limited and fallible, 
that pregnant women do not lose their rights to autonomy merely by be- 
coming pregnant, and, most importantly, that doctors who believe that a 
medical intervention will benefit the fetus andlor the mother should ex- 
haust all possible avenues of explanation and persuasion before seeking a 
court order, including consultation with an institutional ethics comrnit- 
tee.215 
Significantly, medical groups recognize the need to view pregnant 
women's decisionmaking in its full social and economic context. ACOG 
alerts physicians to the risk that "clinicians' conclusions reinforce exist- 
208. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 
1999). At the hearing, five physicians testified that the risk of uterine rupture during vaginal deliv- 
ery was too high (from "four to six percent"), and that if there was rupture, the fetus was likely to die 
during delivery. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. at 1252-53. Neither the state nor federal court addressed 
the question of informed consent, that is, who was entitled to make the fetal risk assessment. See 
generally id. at 1251-57 (discussing only the issues of substantive due process, procedural due 
process, professional negligence, and false imprisonment). 
209. Id. at 1250. 
210. Id. at 1251. 
2 1 1. David Weiss, Court Delivers Controversy, Mom Rejects C-Sections; Gives Birth on Own 
Terms, TIMES LEADER Jan. 16, 2004; Associated Press, New Questions about Childbirth Rights, 
May 19,2004, available at http://keyetv.com/hea1th/health-story_l40110423.html. 
2 12. Weiss, supra note 2 1 1. 
213. Id. 
214. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 36; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 35; American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 
36. 
21 5. AMENCAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS &GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 34-35. 
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ing gender, class, or racial inequality."216 The American Medical Asso- 
ciation (AMA) agrees that legal interventions during pregnancy are sel- 
dom, if ever, proper,217 and emphatically rejects "criminal sanctions or 
civil liability" for pregnant women based on their conduct "toward [their] 
. . . fetus."218 Instead, the AMA endorses a comprehensive, long-term 
approach to substance abuse, to begin in adolescence and continue 
through pregnancy and beyond, in recognition of the fact that addiction 
to alcohol and other drugs is a disease.219 
Many physicians believe that seeking judicial intervention to com- 
pel women to accept treatment during pregnancy is counter-productive, 
not only leading to a loss of trust in the health care system on the part of 
the particular woman who is the object of the intervention, but also deter- 
ring other women from seeking care.220 This problem is compounded 
when women are forcibly restrained while an unwanted medical proce- 
dure is performed,221 or when pregnant women are confined in prison 
hospitals, which often meet only the most minimal standards of health 
care and, at the same time, make it possible for a woman to have access 
to drugs.222 
4. Fetal Guardians 
Another way that courts have separated pregnant women from their 
fetuses, undermining women's right to self-determination, is through the 
appointment of fetal guardians. Sometimes such appointments are the 
means used to compel women to accept medical treatment to benefit the 
216. Id.at35. 
217. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 36 (stating that a physician might seek 
judicial action to override a woman's informed treatment refusal only "[ilf an exceptional circum- 
stance could be found in which a medical treatment poses an insignificant or no health risk to the 
woman, entails a minimal invasion of her bodily integrity, and would clearly prevent substantial and 
irreversible harm to her fetus"). 
218. Id. 
219. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY H-420.976: ALCOHOL AND OTHER 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE DURING PREGNANCY, available at http://www.ama- 
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.html (click "accept"; search "420.976"): AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION, POLICY H-95.976: DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES - THE NEXT GENERATION, 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex~catego/11760.html (c ick "accept"; search 
"95.976"). 
220. Helene Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 J.A.M.A. 2663, 2667 (1990); 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 36. Similar concerns have 
been raised about mandatory maternal HIV testing in order to reduce maternal-fetal transmission of 
the virus. See, e.g., Comm. on HIV PrenatallNewbom Testing, Prenatal/1Vavborn HIV Testing, 49 
THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 420 (1 994). 
221. See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 400 (111. App. 1997) (reversing a trial 
court's decision to appoint a hospital the "temporary custodian of Fetus Brown, with the right to 
consent to one or more blood transfusions for [his mother] when advised of such necessity by any 
attending physician"). 
222. Cole, supra note 220. 
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fetus.223 More frequently, they are a direct challenge to a pregnant 
woman's right to have an abortion.224 
In Alabama, trial judges have appointed fetal "guardians" as part of 
their procedures for determining whether pregnant teenagers can obtain 
an abortion without parental consent, a practice whose legality the Ala- 
bama Supreme Court has declined to address.225 Such fetal guardian- 
ships turn what may already be an intimidating but parentalistic proceed- 
ing into an adversarial one, effectively changing the burden of proof es- 
tablished by the legislature in authorizing a judicial bypass proceed- 
ing.226 For example, in one case, the trial court appointed a guardian ad 
litem for the fetus, whom the court denominated "Baby ~ e r e s a . " ~ ~ ~  The 
guardian ad litem called three witnesses who worked at organizations 
opposed to abortion, "Sav-A-Life" and the "COPE Crisis Pregnancy 
Center," and cross-examined the minor about whether she had consulted 
these or other anti-abortion groups in making her decision.228 In another 
case, a judge (perhaps the same one) declared, 
I have . . . as has been my practice for five years now, appointed a 
lawyer to represent your unborn child, because I do not feel that the 
court should be placed in the position of being a cross-examiner, an 
advocate for one side or the other, so I've appointed someone to rep- 
resent the silent voice in this case.229 
In 2003, the wife of a Florida prosecutor petitioned to be appointed 
guardian of the fetus in the case of a severely retarded woman who had 
been raped at the group home where she resided, in order to prevent the 
woman from having an abortion.230 The rape victim suffered from au- 
tism, cerebral palsy, and a seizure disorder, in addition to her retardation, 
223. See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 400, 406 (reversing a trial court's decision to 
appoint a hospital the "temporary custodian of Fetus Brown" and appointing the Cook County, 
Illinois Public Guardian as the "guardian ad litem" for Fetus Brown in order to override the pregnant 
woman's refusal of blood transfusions, based on her religious beliefs). 
224. See Benten v. Kessler, 1192 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 14747 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding in a 
pregnant woman's class action suit to enjoin the Food and Drug Administration's ban on the impor- 
tation of RU-486, an abortifacient drug, that an attorney could not intervene on behalf of the 
woman's non-viable fetus, declaring that "[tlhe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision 
for appointing a guardian ad litem for a fetus"). See also In re Nancy Klein, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. 
LEXlS 1613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding, in the case of a comatose woman injured in a accident, 
that her husband should be appointed guardian with authority to terminate her pregnancy, and that a 
stranger could not be appointed guardian of her fetus, since a non-viable fetus was not "a legally 
recognized 'person,"' (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))). 
225. In re Anonymous, 810 So. 2d 786,795 (Ala. 2001). 
226. As one trial judge explained, "it has been my practice for three years now when I'm faced 
with these cases to not only have a lawyer for you but to have a lawyer to represent the interest of 
the unborn child." Id. at 789. See also In re Anonymous, 889 So. 2d 525, 525 (Ala. 2003) (Johns- 
tone, J., dissenting, in discussing evidence of the trial court's bias against abortion). 
227. In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429,429-30 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). 
228. In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d at 429-30. 
229. In re Anonymous, 889 So. 2d at 527 (Johnstone, J., dissenting, in discussing evidence of 
the trial court's bias against abortion) (emphasis added). 
230. In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534,536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
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but the putative guardian only expressed concern that the woman was 
taking medications which could injure the fetus.231 Both the trial judge 
and the mid-level appellate court rebuffed the request for guardianship, 
holding that Florida law did not authorize such an appointment.232 They 
noted that Florida law instead authorized guardians to be appointed for 
mentally incompetent women to protect their interests, with the guardian 
to consider whether an abortion was appropriate as "necessary to save 
the life or preserve the health of the pregnant woman," subject to court 
In response to the decision in J.D.S., Governor Jeb Bush 
announced his intention to seek a change in Florida law, but these efforts 
have been unsuccessful so far.234 
E. New Abortion Laws 
New laws seeking to limit abortions reflect new fetal protection in 
two different ways. First, in addition to the federal Partial Birth Abortion 
A C ~ , ~ ~ ~  a number of states, as well as Congress, have enacted laws which 
seek to limit women's access to necessary health care by prohibiting so- 
called "partial birth" abortions, a term which suggests that the fetus in 
such cases is fully formed or capable of being born.236 Second, laws 
have been proposed in Congress and state legislatures which, in the name 
of requiring "informed consent," make the fetus more vivid and alive, 
with the goal of discouraging women from choosing abortion. 
So-called "partial birth" abortion laws are criticized on four major 
grounds.237 First, and foremost, these statutes do not acknowledge that 
most "partial birth" abortions take place under urgent or even emergent 
medical circumstances. These include the discovery that the fetus is an- 
encephalic, hydrocephalic, or suffers from a fatal genetic defect, or the 
determination that an alternative abortion procedure would put the 
mother's health at risk.238 If "partial birth" abortions are prohibited, 
--- 
231. In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d at 536. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 539 (discussing the requirements of FLA. STAT. ANN. 390.01 1 l(1) and (3) (West 
2006)). 
234. Bob Mahlburg, Senate Chief Wary of Fetus Guardian Bill [-I Governor Finds House 
Support, Won't Back Down on Legislation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 28,2004, at B1. 
235. 18 U.S.C.A. 5 1531 (West 2006). 
236. The Virginia law, for example, refers to the types of abortion prohibited as "partial-birth 
infanticide." VA. CODE. ANN. 8 18.2-7 1.1 (West 2006). 
237. A full discussion of "partial-birth" abortion bans is beyond the scope of this article; in any 
case, the Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the federal law next term. Carhart v. 
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), affg Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 
2004), cert. grantedsub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006). 
238. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER, available at 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/news--on- 
access/trimester-abortion-6140.htm (citing SHELDON CHERRY & IRWIN MERKATZ, COMPLICATIONS 
OF PREGNANCY: MEDICAL, SURGICAL, GYNECOLOGIC, PSYCHOSOCIAL, AND PERINATAL (4th ed. 
1991) and MAUREEN PAUL, A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION (1999)). 
Medical complications for the woman include infections, heart failure, malignant hypertension, 
uncontrolled diabetes, renal disease, depression and suicidal tendencies. Id. In addition, many 
Heinonline - -  84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 5 7 2  2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7  
20061 THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION" 5 73 
women may be rendered sterile or otherwise unable to have other chil- 
dren, suggesting that "partial birth" abortion bans are not only anti- 
female, but also "anti-life" in practice.239 Second, these "partial birth" 
laws describe abortion procedures using language inconsistent with 
medical parlance, making it impossible for a physician to know whether 
the technique used in a particular case is proscribed and thus rendering 
the law unconstitutionally vague.240 Third, the laws' lack of an exemp- 
tion for the mother's health is incompatible with prior decisions of the 
Supreme Court, which has held repeatedly that the state's interest in pro- 
tecting the potential life of a fetus cannot supersede its interest in protect- 
ing the health and life of the pregnant woman.241 Finally, these laws are 
not limited to "late" or third trimester abortions, but could apply as early 
as twelve weeks, when a fetus would clearly not be viable, and thus are 
incompatible with Roe v. and Planned Parenthood of Southeast- 
ern Pennsylvania v. ~ a s e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Recently, proposals have been offered which, while nominally per- 
mitting abortion, conceptualize the fetus as a child in order to encourage 
women not to have abortions. The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 
2005 would require that abortion providers inform all women seeking 
abortion that Congress has determined that an "unbom child" may ex- 
perience pain at twenty weeks or more after fe r t i l i~a t ion ,~~~ give each 
women face barriers that delay their access to abortion until the second trimester, including poverty, 
partner abuse, geographic difficulty in finding an abortion provider, and teenage status. See Brief for 
Seventy-Five Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon- 
dents, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830), 2000 WL 340122. 
239. Forcing physicians to use other, older abortion techniques increases the risk of infection 
and laceration as an option increases the chance of uterine perforations, cervical lacerations, hemor- 
rhaging, and infection, all of which can lead to sterility. See Women's Med. Prof l Corp. v. Voino- 
vich, 91 1 F. Supp. 1051, 1069-70, affd 130 F.3d 187 (1997). 
240. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939-46 (2000); see also Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 
791 (8th Cir. 2005), affg Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004), cert. grantedsub 
nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006). 
241. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-31; Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 
2005). 
242. 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973). 
243. 505 U.S. 833,879 (1992). 
244. Before an abortion could be performed, the woman would have to be told the following: 
You are considering having an abortion of an unborn child who will have developed, at 
the time of the abortion, approximately XX weeks after fertilization. The Congress of the 
United States has determined that at this stage of development, an unborn child has the 
physical structures necessary to experience pain. There is substantial evidence that by this 
point, unbom children draw away from surgical instruments in a manner which in an in- 
fant or an adult would be interpreted as a response to pain. Congress finds that there is 
substantial evidence that the process of being killed in an abortion will cause the unborn 
child pain, even though you receive a pain-reducing drug or drugs. Under the Federal 
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, you have the option of choosing to have an- 
esthesia or other pain-reducing drug or drugs administered directly to the pain-capable 
unborn child if you so desire. The purpose of administering such drug or drugs would be 
to reduce or eliminate the capacity of the unborn child to experience pain during the abor- 
tion procedure. In some cases, there may be some additional risk to you associated with 
administering such a drug. 
S. 46, 109th Cong. $2902 (2005). 
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woman an Unborn Child Pain Awareness ~ r o c h u r e , ~ ~ ~  and require her to 
sign an Unborn Child Pain Awareness Decision Form, indicating 
whether or not she wishes to have her "pain-capable unborn child" to 
receive anesthesia.246 Other proposals would set an even earlier date for 
a woman contemplating abortion to be told about the fetus' potential to 
experience pain.247 At least one law would impose a twenty-four hour 
waiting period in which the pregnant woman is to consider the informa- 
tion regarding fetal pain prior to having the abortion,248 exacerbating the 
pressure on women not to have an abortion.249 
Although legislative mandating of explicit informed consent re- 
quirements is not unprecedented,250 the Unborn Child Pain Awareness 
Act of 2005 is unusual in its detailed explanation of the procedure con- 
templated.25' All other laws mandating the specifics of the informed 
consent dialogue require informing the patient of the consequences of the 
contemplated medical procedure to her, not a third party. Imagine, for 
example, a statute requiring a prospective kidney donor be told about the 
impact of the decision to donate on the donor's child, because of the risk 
that the donor might die after donating the kidney. Courts have increas- 
ingly recognized that as competent adults, parents are able to accept or 
reject medical treatment based on their personal views of what is best for 
them, and have not required them to take their children's interests into 
account. 252 
245. This Brochure would be developed by the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
include: "the same information as required under the statement under subsection (b)(2)(A)(i), includ- 
ing greater detail on her option of having a pain-reducing drug or drugs administered to the unborn 
child to reduce the experience of pain by the unbom child during the abortion." S. 46, 109th Cong. 
$2902 (2005). 
246. The law would require that the woman sign an Unborn Child Pain Awareness Decision 
Form, which shall: 
(A) with respect to the pregnant woman- 
(i) contain a statement that a f f ~ m  that the woman has received or been offered all of the 
information required in subsection (b); 
(ii) require the woman to explicitly either request or rehse the administration of pain- 
reducing drugs to the unbom child; and 
(iii) be signed by a pregnant woman prior to the performance of an abortion involving a 
pain-capable unborn child. 
S. 46, 109th Cong. $2902 (2005). 
247. Under the Montana Unborn Child Pain Prevention Act, all women contemplating abortion 
at 16 weeks or later would have to be informed that the fetus could feel pain. H.B. 238, 59th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005). 
248. H.B. 238,59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005). 
249. Imposing a waiting period is believed to add a significant bamer to abortion access. 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 228. 
250. See, e.g., S.G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer 
Treatment Alternatives, 86 J .  NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202 (1994) (discussing state laws that require 
that women contemplating mastectomy be told of the range of treatment options available); and 
similar laws governing hysterectomy (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $ 1690 (West 2006)) and 
sterilization (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 436.225 (West 2006)). 
251. CJ OR. REV. STAT. $5 127.80G.897 (1998) (popularly known as Oregon's Death with 
Dignity Law). 
252. See, e.g., Nonvood Hospital v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 @lass. 1991) (holding that 
a mother who was a Jehovah's Witness could decline to receive a medically recommended blood 
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Several legislators have introduced laws which compel women to 
contemplate their fetuses as "unborn" children in other ways. These in- 
clude laws that require that women be given the opportunity to visualize 
their fetus in a sonogram and to hear the fetus' heartbeat, as a precondi- 
tion to the "informed consent" necessary to receive an abortion,253 as 
well as laws that provide federal funding to purchase sonogram equip- 
ment for this purpose.254 These laws increase government involvement 
in a heretofore private trend: the use of sonogram technology by anti- 
abortion groups,255 which have found that women are less likely to 
choose abortion if they see a sonographic image of their fetus.256 
11. THE FETUS AND CHILD IN AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 
A. The Status of the Fetus in American Law 
To put current "fetal protection" law in context, it is necessary to 
trace briefly the common law and statutory trend toward recognition of 
the fetus as a legal entity, although in most instances this recognition 
arises after a child has been born.257 At common law the fetus was not 
considered a legal person, and it was only after birth that a child had le- 
gal rights. The "born alive" rule governed criminal,258 tort,259 and inheri- 
t a n ~ e ~ ~ '  law. 
transfusion, even though doctors testified that without it she was likely to die, leaving her young son 
with only one parent). 
253. See, e.g., S.B. 76, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005) (amending title 28, article 34, chapter 2, 
section 1.1 of the Indiana Code to require that at least eighteen hours prior to abortion, a woman be 
told of the "availability of fetal ultrasound imaging and auscultation of fetal heart tone services to 
enable the pregnant woman to view the image and hear the heartbeat of the fetus and how to obtain 
access to those services"). 
254. The proposed Informed Choice Act would authorize the Department of Health and Human 
Services to make grants to tax-exempt "community based pregnancy help medical clinic[s]" to 
provide ultrasound equipment to be used to give the woman a "visual image of the fetus," informa- 
tion about its probable gestational age, and information on abortion and its alternatives. H.R. Con. 
2 16, 109th Cong. (2005). 
255. Since 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services has been funding crisis preg- 
nancy centers because they support President Bush's "abstinence-only" position on premarital sex 
education. See Kashef, supra note 5. 
256. Neela Banejee, Church Groups Turn to Sonogram to Turn Womenfrom Abortions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2,2005, at Al. 
257. See infra notes 260-273. But see Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, at 920 
(Mass. 1975) (permitting parents to recover under a wrongfbl death theory due to bus company's 
negligence that caused the stillbirth of a viable fetus). 
258. See supra text accompanying notes 1 13-121 (noting the born-alive rule precluded prose- 
cution for homicide for causing the death of a fetus); See also Commonwealth v. Moms, 142 S.W.3d 
654,655-57 (Ky. 2004) (discussing the history of the rule). 
259. See, e.g., Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Dam- 
ages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R. 3d 41 1 (2004). 
260. See, e.g., Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. 1951) (discussing 
common law rules on inheritance, permitting children to sue after birth for interests that came into 
being while they were in utero); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE 4 2-109 (amended 2005) (permitting 
children conceived before an individual's death but born thereafter to inherit). See also David E. 
Koropp, Note, Setting the Standard: A Mother's Duty During the Prenatal Period, 1989 ILL. L. REV. 
493,495, n.13. 
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1. Tort Liability 
The first case to apply the "born alive" rule in American tort law 
was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of ~ o r t h a m ~ t o n . ~ ~ '  In Dietrich, a pregnant 
woman slipped and fell and suffered a miscamage, with her four or five 
month old fetus living only for a few minutes. Mr. Justice Holmes, then 
sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, observed that "no 
case . . . has ever decided that, if the infant survived, it could maintain an 
action for injuries received by it while in its mother's womb." In his 
view, this was wholly appropriate, since "the unborn child was a part of 
the mother at  the time of the injury."262 
Dietrich was followed for seventy-five years, until the 1946 deci- 
sion in Bonbrest v. K ~ t z . ~ ~ ~  In Bonbrest, the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia held that a viable fetus, injured through 
medical malpractice, had a cause of action against the physician who 
negligently delivered him. The decision spawned a rapid retreat from the 
born alive rule, accomplished by both statutory and case law. Today, 
every state allows a suit for prenatal injuries if the infant is born alive,264 
and most states permit a wrongful death suit to be brought on behalf of a 
viable fetus who succumbs prior to birth due to prenatal injury.265 A 
minority of states also permits suit on behalf of a non-viable fetus.266 
Other states have recognized causes of action for loss of consortium on 
the part of parents whose fetus has been killed due to the tortious acts by 
others. 267 
261. 138 Mass. 14 (1884). 
262. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17 (emphasis added). 
263. 65F.Supp.138@.D.C.1946). 
264. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522,528 (W.Va. 1995). 
265. See Michael P. Penick, Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 19 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 107 
(2004); Jill D. Washbum Helbling, Symposium, To Recover or Not to Recover: A State by State 
Survey of Fetal Wrongfir1 Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363 (1996). See also Meyer v. Burger 
King Corp., 26 P.3d 925,928-30 (Wash. 2001) (holding that the Washington worker's compensation 
statute did not bar a suit brought by a child allegedly deprived of oxygen in utero due to his mother's 
employer negligence). Indeed, employers' fear of tort liability for causing harm to the fetuses of 
their female employees is a major rationale of fetal protection policies in the workplace, which 
exclude some women from high-paying but hazardous positions. See Elaine Draper, Reproductive 
Hazarak and Fetal Exclusion Policies affer Johnson Controls, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 117, 118, 
121 (2001). For a fuller discussion of the gendered nature of the construction of workplace risks, see 
id. and discussion infra at text accompanying notes 323-344. Nine states (California, Florida, Iowa, 
Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Virginia) require that a child be born alive 
before a suit for prenatal injuries can be brought. See Penick, supra; Helbling, supra. 
266. See, e.g., Wiersma v. Maple Leaf F a m ,  543 N.W.2d. 787 (S.D. 1996) (holding that the 
South Dakota wrongful death statute should be interpreted to authorize a cause of action for wrong- 
ful death for non-viable fetuses, and surveying the law in other jurisdictions in the process); C o ~ o r  
v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 91-93 (Mo. 1995) (construing Missouri's wrongful death 
statute to permit a cause of action for a non-viable fetus in light of a Missouri statute of general 
applicability that declares that "[tlhe life of each human being begins at conception.. .."). 
267. See, e.g., Broadnax v. Gonzales, 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004) (permitting a woman to 
recover for emotional injury for a miscarriage or stillbirth due to medical malpractice, even if she 
herself does not suffer physical injury); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Iowa 1983) 
(holding that a parent could recover for loss of consortium even though Iowa does not recognize a 
cause of action for wrongful fetal death, because a loss of consortium action is based on parental, 
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Only a handful of American courts have addressed the question of 
whether tort liability can be imposed on pregnant women based on their 
conduct during pregnancy. Three courts have upheld such liability, 
while three courts have rejected it. These cases are important in address- 
ing the normative question of who is the reasonable pregnant woman, as 
well as the related question of who gets to evaluate her conduct. 
Grodin v.  rodi in^^' was the first case to permit a woman to be sued 
for her actions while pregnant.269 The Michigan Court of Appeals al- 
lowed the father of a child born with discolored teeth to sue the child's 
mother (and his wife) for these injuries, allegedly caused by the woman's 
taking Tetracycline@ while pregnant. Without analyzing the conse- 
quences of its decision for pregnant women, the court framed the ques- 
tion as a simple one of fact: did the woman's use of Tetracycline@ con- 
stitute a "reasonable exercise of parental discretion?" If it did, this con- 
duct would fall within an exception to the general abrogation of parental- 
child tort immunity under Michigan law, and the woman could not be 
sued. 270 
Two other cases, Bonte v. ~ o n t e , ~ ~ '  and National Casualty Co. v. 
Northern Trust Bank of Florida, N . A . , ~ ~ ~  also permitted suit to be 
brought on behalf of children who were injured due to their mothers' 
alleged negligence while pregnant. In Bonte, the mother was struck by a 
car while crossing the street and her child was born with severe brain 
damage and cerebral palsy.273 The New Hampshire Supreme Court held 
that a suit could go forward, relying on the abrogation of parent-child tort 
immunity (in part in recognition of the availability of insurance as a 
source of recovery) and the law that a child born alive can bring a cause 
of action for injuries suffered in utero against a third party.274 The court 
rejected the argument that either the unique relationship between a preg- 
nant woman and her fetus or the potential deprivation of a woman's right 
to control her life during pregnancy should preclude liability.275 The 
court held that a pregnant woman was "required to act with . . . the same 
standard of care as that required of her once the child is born."276 
- - 
rather than fetal, loss). Loss of consortium has been recognized as a cause of action at least since the 
time of Hammurabi, although his code explicitly calculated damages based on the social class of the 
pregnant woman. The Code of Hammurabi, $ 5  209 and 213 (L.W.King trans.), available at 
http://www.leb.net/-farrashisto~yhammurabi~htm (declaring that a free born woman was entitled to 
receive ten shekels for her loss while a maid-servant was entitled to receive two shekels). 
268. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
269. Grodin, 310 N.W.2d 869. 
270. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the "'reasonableness' of the 
[mother's] alleged negligent conduct." Id. at 87 1. 
271. 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992). 
272. 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
273. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 464. 
274. Id. at 465-66. 
275. Id. at 466. 
276. Id. 
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A similar result was reached by a Florida appellate court in National 
Casualty Co., which ruled that a child could sue its mother for injuries 
allegedly caused by her negligent driving while pregnant, up to the 
amount of her automobile insurance coverage.277 The court's brief opin- 
ion held that there was no reason to "den[y] . . . recovery merely because 
of the identity of the t o r t f ea~or , "~~~  rejecting concerns about the impact 
of its decision on the mother's privacy and personal health, and distin- 
guishing State v. Ashley, in which the Florida Supreme Court held a 
pregnant woman who shot herself and caused the death of her fetus could 
not be charged criminally.279 
In contrast, three courts have adamantly rebuffed suits brought by 
children against their mothers for injuries suffered in utero. In Stallman 
v. ~ o u n ~ ~ u i s t , ~ ~ ~  the Illinois Supreme Court held that a child who suf- 
fered prenatal injuries in a car accident in which her mother was driving 
could not sue her mother for negligence.281 The court first criticized the 
Grodin decision, suggesting that the Michigan court had confused the 
question of whether parental tort immunity should be abrogated with the 
different issue of whether a pregnant woman owed a tort duty to her fe- 
tus.282 The Stallman court confronted the latter issue directly. It empha- 
sized that the relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus she 
was carrying was unique and "unlike the relationship between any other 
plaintiff and defendant,"283 and thus could not be analogized to other 
negligence situations. The Illinois Supreme Court held that in view of 
the "fact of life" that a pregnant woman's "every waking and sleeping 
moment . . . shapes the prenatal environment which forms the world for 
the developing fetus,"284 it was impermissible to impose a duty of care 
on a pregnant woman.285 
The court asserted four grounds for its decision. First, it would be 
impossible to either limit or define the duty of a pregnant woman toward 
her fetus, since many actions taksn in a woman's life, even prior to con- 
ception, could affect a fetus.286 Second, it would be impossible to de- 
velop an objective standard applicable to women fiom diverse socio- 
economic backgrounds, whose access to health care differed, and who 
might or might not know whether they were pregnant.287 Third, the court 
recognized that creating a common law cause of action had the potential 
National Casualty, 807 So. 2d 86. 
Id. at 87. 
Id. at 87-88 (citing State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997)). 
53 1 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988). 
Stallman, 53 1 N.E.2d at 361. 
Id. at 358. 
Id. at 360. 
Id. 
Id. at 359-61. 
Id. at 360. 
Id. 
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for "unprecedented intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of the [fe- 
male] citizens of this It held that if a duty was to be recog- 
nized, it must be by the legislature, "only after thorough investigation, 
study, and debate."289 Finally, the court urged that "[tlhe way to effectu- 
ate the birth of healthy babies is not . . . through after-the-fact civil liabil- 
ity in tort for individual mothers, but rather through before-the-fact edu- 
cation of all women and families about prenatal development."290 
Chenault v. ~ u i e ~ ~ '  addressed the more difficult factual circum- 
stances in which Huie, a pregnant woman (and her boyfriend) abused 
alcohol and other drugs while she was pregnant, and she gave birth to a 
child with developmental problems and cerebral palsy.292 Huie's sister 
sued on behalf of the child, seeking compensatory and punitive damages 
for Huie's alleged negligence and gross negligence.293 The Texas Court 
of Appeals declined to recognize a child's common law cause of action 
against its mother for prenatally-caused injuries. The court declared that 
while "the law wisely no longer treats a fetus as only a part of the 
mother, the law would ignore the equally important physical realities of 
pregnancy if it treated the fetus as an individual entirely separate from 
his mother."294 The court pointed to the difftculty of establishing an 
objective, uniform standard of care for pregnant and potentially pregnant 
women, noting the inevitable subjectivity of after-the-fact jury decision- 
making, which would lead to inconsistent and unpredictable jury ver- 
dicts, as well as the invasion of women's autonomy and right to control 
their daily lives.295 The court declared that recognizing a duty of women 
toward their fetuses was the province of the legislature, which alone 
could conduct the necessary "research and analysis of scientific and 
medical data . . . [and] evaluat[e] . . . broad matters of public 
Finally, the court expressed the concern that imposing civil liability 
might be counterproductive, because women who feared civil liability 
might not be candid with their physicians, and thus would receive less 
than adequate prenatal care. 297 
In 2004, in Remy v. ~ a c ~ o n a l d , ~ ~ ~  the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court declined to permit a child to sue its mother for prenatal 
harm.299 In Remy, the plaintiff alleged that her mother drove negligently 
while pregnant, causing the plaintiff to be born prematurely with adverse 
Id. at 361. 
Id. 
Id. 
989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475. 
Id. 
Id. at 475-76. 
Id. at 477-78. 
Id. at 478. 
Id. 
801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004). 
Remy, 801 N.E.2d at 266. 
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health consequences. The court followed Stallman and Chenault, em- 
phasizing the substantial disagreement about whether pregnant women 
should be held liable for causing fetal harm, observing that there were 
virtually unlimited circumstances in which a woman could be sued, and 
declaring that there was no principled way to limit the liability of preg- 
nant women for causing fetal harm to the motor vehicle context.300 The 
court explicitly rejected the reasoning of Grodin, Bonte, and National 
Casualty Co., and found that courts should recognize "that there are in- 
herent and important difference~ between a fetus, in utero, and a child 
already born, that permits [sic] a bright line to be drawn around the zone 
of potential tort liability of one who is still biologically joined to an in- 
jured plaintiff.y730' 
The approach of Remy, Stallman, and Chenault is similar to that set 
forth by the Supreme Court of Canada, whose reasoning is instructive. 
The Court has held consistently over the last fifteen years that a pregnant 
woman and her fetus share a unique relationship, in which there is only 
one legal person, rather than two persons with potentially adverse posi- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  In Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. 
(D.F.), the Court noted, "[Tlhe law has always treated the mother and 
unborn child as one. To sue a pregnant woman on behalf of her unborn 
fetus therefore posits the anomaly of one part of a legal and physical 
entity suing itself."303 In Dobson v. Dobson, the Court explained that 
there was no principled way to limit the circumstances under which the 
woman could be held liable, due to the extraordinarily close physical 
proximity between the woman and her fetus, and the enormous range of 
actions which the woman could take which could have a detrimental 
effect on fetal development.304 "Everything the pregnant woman eats or 
drinks, and every physical action she takes, may affect the foetus."305 
The Court further identified two important public policy concerns "mili- 
tatring] against the imposition of maternal tort liability for prenatal neg- 
ligence[:] . . . the privacy and autonomy rights of women and . . . the 
difficulties inherent in articulating a judicial standard of conduct for 
pregnant women."306 The Court emphasized that simply because a 
woman is pregnant, she does not lose "the right to make personal deci- 
sions, to control [her] . . . bodily integrity, and to refuse unwanted medi- 
300. Id. at 264-66. 
301. Id. at 267. 
302. Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G .  (D.F.), [I9971 3 S.C.R. 925 MI 
27-29 (holding that a pregnant woman addicted to solvents could not be civilly committed for treat- 
ment) and Dobson v. Dobson, [I9991 174 D.L.R. (4th) Q 1 (rejecting tort liability for a pregnant 
woman who allegedly drove negligently, causing injury to her fetus and declaring that, "[tlhe rela- 
tionship between a pregnant woman and her foetus is unique and innately recognized as one of great 
and special importance to society"). 
303. Winnipeg Child & Family Services, 3 S.C.R. at Q 27. 
304. See Dobson 174 D.L.R.. at Q 20. 
305. Id. at Q 27. 
306. Id.atQ21. 
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cal treatment."307 The Court finally noted the difficulty in developing a 
workable judicial standard of conduct for pregnant women, stating it 
would be impossible to articulate an objective standard because the con- 
text of every pregnant woman's life is different, with women who are 
well-educated and ignorant, rich and poor, with and without access to 
good health care and good prenatal care.308 The court observed that "the 
reasonable pregnant woman" standard would inevitably be interpreted in 
light of the trier of fact's prejudices about the proper conduct of pregnant 
women. 309 
2. Child Neglect and Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights 
In contrast to the split over whether pregnant women should be li- 
able for prenatal torts, all states agree that a woman's use of alcohol or 
other drugs while pregnant is a proper trigger for taking custody of a 
child as "neglected," and may be the basis for terminating her parental 
rights.310 The jurisprudence in this area can be succinctly summarized: 
"Courts rarely side with drug abusing parents where children are con- 
~erned."~" Courts do differ, however, over the jurisdictional question of 
whether a fetus may be considered a child and the further question of 
whether a woman's substance abuse during pregnancy is in itself suffi- 
cient to justify the loss of parental rights.312 
307. Id. at 7 32 (citing the ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 
PROCEED WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE T CHNOLOGIES 955-56 (1993)). 
308. Id. at 7 54. 
309. Id. at Q 53. 
310. Some states statutes explicitly authorize courts to consider prenatal substance abuse. See, 
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN $5 19-3-102(1)(g) (West 2005) (declaring that a child is neglected or 
dependent if it is born with controlled substances in its system); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, $ 7001- 
1.3(14)(c) (West 2006) (declaring that a child born dependent on controlled substance is a "deprived 
child"). Other states have achieved the same result through judicial interpretation of more general 
child neglect criteria. See, e.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (applying 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE $ 300 (a) (West 2006) to a child born to a mother who ingested drugs 
during pregnancy); In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a new- 
born with a positive toxicology screen is per se an abused child under the Ohio civil child abuse 
statute); see also In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (quoting N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT $ 1046 (a) (iii) (1981)) (holding that allegations that a mother admitted drug use 
while pregnant and that her infant had a positive toxicology test are sufficient to permit a child 
neglect proceeding to go forward). 
31 1. Mary E. Taylor, Annotation, Parent's Use of Drugs as Factor in Award of Custody of 
Children, Visitation Rights, or Termination of Parental Rights, 20 A.L.R. 5th 534 , $2 [b] (2005). 
312. In In re Valerie D., the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a woman's use of drugs 
while pregnant could not, standing alone, justify the termination of her parental rights, and also 
found that by taking the child away immediately after birth, the state made it impossible for the 
mother to establish that she had an appropriate and ongoing relationship with her child. 613 A.2d 
748, 752-53 (Corn. 1992). See also In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S- 
120171, 905 P.2d 555, 558 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "while chronic use of drugs or alco- 
hol by either parent during the mother's pregnancy may reflect a pattern of substance abuse and may 
be so telling of the kind of environment to which the child will be born as to justify the child's im- 
mediate removal from the parents at birth, chronic substance abuse during pregnancy in and of itself 
does not reflect an inability to parent that would justify severance of a parent's fundamental rights"); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 201-13 (regarding the jurisdiction of juvenile and family 
courts over fetuses, as opposed to children). Other courts have come to a different conclusion, cj: In 
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As always in child abuse and neglect cases, there are competing 
goals and strategies, which are magnified in the case of parents313 who 
use alcohol and other drugs. The law's basic premise is that it is the 
child's, rather than the parent's, best interests, which are paramount. 
This leads to early intervention by child welfare authorities to protect a 
child at riskY3l4 and means in practice that many courts have ruled that 
children born with positive toxicology screens for illegal drugs andlor 
other evidence of prenatal drug exposure may be temporarily removed 
from their parents' On the other hand, parental advocates 
may urge a watchful waiting period and argue that more family support 
services and drug treatment should be provided, in order to make it more 
likely that children may remain with their parents, whose interest in the 
enjoyment of a relationship with their children is constitutionally pro- 
t e ~ t e d . ~ ' ~  The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (AFSA)~'~ gives 
states financial incentives to expeditiously terminate parental rights, with 
the laudable goal of not leaving children in foster care limbo while their 
parents struggle to get their lives in order.318 Since the law translates "the 
best interests of the child" as "less time spent in foster care," the result 
has been faster termination of parental rights.319 Many commentators 
have asserted that "the 12-month permanency clock for children ignores 
the clock of treatment for addiction, which is at best 24 months," and that 
the statute operates in a draconian and counter-productive manner in the 
re Baby Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462,464 (Ohio 2000), but in most cases there are factors in addition 
to the mother's prenatal drug use that are cited in support of the decision to terminate parental rights. 
See, e.g., In re W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804,808 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
3 13. It is important to remember that there are often two parents involved, and frequently that 
the father is also a drug user or the one whose physical and emotional abuse exacerbates the 
mother's vulnerability to drug use. See Francisco G. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2001) (upholding the termination of a father's parental rights where his alcohol abuse and 
domestic violence had not been addressed and he supported the mother's assertion that she did not 
have a drug problem when there was overwhelming evidence to the contrary). 
314. See, e.g., In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d at 284 ("[A] court cannot and should 
not 'await broken bone or shattered psyche before extending its protective cloak around [a] child 
pursuant to . . . article 10 of the Family Court Act . . . ."' (citations omitted)). Courts have justified 
their decision by citing the child's "right to begin life with a sound mind and body." StaIiman, 531 
N.E.2d at 358 (citations omitted). 
315. See, e.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (holding that there was substantial evidence 
to support the juvenile court's finding that a newborn was "in need of proper and effective parental 
care or control" in light of the infant's positive toxicology results for opiates and amphetamines, 
post-birth behavior which suggested prenatal drug exposure, and the mother's continued drug use 
after losing custody of another child due to her drug use). 
316. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In 
re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 125 1 (N.J. 1999). 
317. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 11 1 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections in 
42 U.S.C.A.). 
3 18. 42 U.S.C.A 3 671(a)(15) (West 2006). 
3 19. See Laureen D' Ambra, Terminating the Parental Rights of the Mentally Disabled, 49 R. 1. 
BAR. J. 5, 7 (2001) (discussing the law's shorter time frames for children to remain in foster care, 
with the goal of promoting permanent placement for children); Dorothy Roberts, The Challenge of 
Substance Abuse for Family Preservation Policy, 3 J .  HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 72,73-76 (1999). 
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case of drug-abusing women. 320 The AFSA's push for a quick decision 
about termination of parental rights is also problematic in view of most 
states' inadequate drug treatment  resource^.^^' Many drug treatment 
programs are simply not tailored to mothers, who need both child care 
and a treatment philosophy different from the "confrontational" and in- 
dividually focused style typical of drug treatment programs designed 
with the male drug addict in mind.322 
B. The Failure to Protect Fetuses and Children @om Work-Related 
Harms 
In contrast to the emphasis of prosecutors, child abuse agencies, and 
some tort plaintiffs on the mother's body and behavior as the locus of 
both fetal harm and protection, government and private actors have 
largely been silent about systemic deficits in the American workplace 
that place parents and their offspring at risk. Two aspects of workplace 
life bear special scrutiny: the dangers to fetal and childhood develop- 
ment posed by male and female workers' exposure to toxic substances, 
and the lack of economically viable parental leave policies, which pre- 
vent many parents from adequately addressing the health and emotional 
needs of their newborns and young children. 
1. Workplace Exposure to Hazardous Substances 
Employers have responded to the risk that workplace exposure to 
toxins and other dangerous substances will injure future children by en- 
320. See Roberts, supra note 3 19, at 77, 86 (quoting Comelia Gmman,  Parents Give Advice 
on Reforming DCFS; Agency Criticized at Panel Hearings, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1999, at Metro 
Chicago 3). 
321. Federal law requires 5% of its Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) Block 
Grant program to improve drug treatment access for pregnant women, but states may seek a waiver 
of this requirement if they can show that there are no access problems. See 45 C.F.R. 5 96.124 
(1993)(c)-(d). Only 14% of the drug treatment facilities in the United States have program specifi- 
cally designed to treat pregnant and postpartum women. OFFICE of APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (N-SSATS): 2003, DATA ON 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITIES 38 (Sept. 2004), 
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/04nssats/nssatO4.pdf. Compounding the lack of adequate treat- 
ment facilities for pregnant women, only 35% of the facilities had programs for persons needing 
treatment for both substance abuse and mental illness. Id. at 37. Such individuals are especially 
likely to fall through the cracks of government sponsored program, as legislation is usually targeted 
at one, but not the other, of these illnesses. Georganne Chapin, Sanctioning Substance-Abusing 
Home Relief Clients with the Loss of Medical Benefits-Legal and Policy Concerns, 7 N.Y.S. BAR 
ASS'N HEALTH L. J. 35.39 (Spring 2002). 
322. See Roberts, supra note 319, at 78; Mary O'Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997: Changing Child WeIfae Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL? 243, 262 (1999); Kathryn T. Jones, Prenatal Substance Abuse: 
Oregon 's Progressive Approach to Treatment and Child Protection Can Support Children, Women 
and Families, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 797 (1999); Holly A. Hills, Deborah Rugs & M. Scott 
Young, Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice: The Impact of Substance Abuse 
Disorders on Women Involved in Dependency Court, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 359 (2004); Jane C. 
Murphy & Margaret J. Potthast, Domestic Violence, Substance Abuse and Child WelJare: The Legal 
System's Response, 3 J .  HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 88 (1999). 
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acting "fetal protection" policies limiting the exposure of women of 
child-bearing age to such substances.323 The Supreme Court ruled in 
1991 in International Union, UA W v. Johnson that a fetal 
protection policy which excludes women from the workplace as a means 
of reducing the risk that a child will be harmed by prenatal toxic expo- 
sure constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 .~~ '  The employer's actions will be illegal unless the 
employer can demonstrate that its policy is a bona fide occupational 
qualification, that is, "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
the particular business."326 However, many employers still implement 
"fetal protection" policies, admitting in effect that they would rather be 
sued for sex discrimination than for damages for causing prenatal in- 
These employers continue to focus exclusively on the risks of 
harm to future children posed via the female body (including harm to the 
woman's reproductive system and to the fetus) rather than acknowledge 
the harm that many substances pose to the male reproductive system. 
However, when studies show that a substance poses harm to the male 
reproductive system, industry and government frequently have acted to 
ban the substance entirely.328 
2. Parenting Leaves 
American law has also failed to mandate paid parenting leaves, 
which would permit parents to take care of newborns, as well as older 
children who become ill. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act 
( F M L A ) ~ ~ ~  requires employers of more than fifty employees to grant 
323. Although the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.A. $8 651-678 (West 2006), 
and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. $5 2601-2692 (West 2006), both mandate that 
the government set safe levels of workplace exposure to many dangerous substances, both acts have 
been weakened by court rulings about the level of scientific proof required for the government to 
demonstrate "significant risk." See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that before promulgating any occu- 
pational safety and health standard, the Secretary of Labor must find that there are "significant risks" 
in a workplace which can be eliminated or decreased by a change in the standard). 
324. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
325. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 207. 
326. Id. at 200 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. $ 2000(e)(l)). In Johnson Controls, the defendant com- 
pany manufactured batteries, in which lead was a major ingredient. Although the company initially 
permitted pregnant women to work in the manufacturing process, informing them of the dangers of 
lead exposure, afier eight women tested with higher blood lead levels than recommended by OSHA, 
the company issued a "fetal protection" policy. This policy excluded "'all women except those 
whose inability to bear children is medically documented,"' but it made no provision for men to 
lower their lead exposure, which has also been shown to pose a risk of fetal harm. Id. at 190-92. 
327. Draper, supra note 265, at 12 1. 
328. The pesticide ethylene dibromide (EDB), for example, was cancelled because of its onco- 
genic and mutagenic risks, as well as reproductive risks to male workers. See EPA Limitation on 
Ethylene Dibrornide, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,234 (Oct. 11, 1983); see also OSHA Limitation on Levels of 
Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,956 (Department of Labor docu- 
ment regarding EDB's effects on male reproductive capacity); cf: Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 
(1991). 
329. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A, 5 
U.S.C.A., 29 U.S.C.A.). 
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employees up to twelve weeks a year of unpaid leave for the birth or 
adoption of a child or for reasons related to illness,330 many critics assert 
that this is insufficient to support vulnerable children in need of parental 
attention and that the unpaid character of such parental leave means that 
existing race and class hierarchies are not remedied.331 The United 
States' policy stands in marked contrast to those of other developed na- 
tions, which give much more generous leaves to working parents.332 
Almost half of American workers are not covered by the F M L A , ~ ~ ~  and 
even among those who are, only a fraction avail themselves of its leave 
provisions, because they cannot afford not to NO federal law 
mandates paid parental leave for the period connected with pregnancy, 
childbirth, and the early stages of infancy,335 and California and Ohio are 
the only two states to mandate any form of paid parental leave.336 In 
contrast, other developed nations either mandate or offer paid parenting 
leave, at least for some portion of this critical stage of fetal and child- 
hood health and development,337 and many countries offer additional 
financial or child-care support to single parents, those who are most 
likely to need leave from work to care for a newborn or ill child and are 
simultaneously the least likely to be able to afford to do so.338 
America's failure to provide paid leave for child-bearing and par- 
enting is both physically and socially harmful to children, as well as eco- 
nomically short-sighted. Many studies indicate that breast-feeding pro- 
vides important health benefits to newborns,339 and it is certainly much 
330. See 29 U.S.C.A. 261 1(4)(a)(i) (West 2006) (defming "Employer" as any person employ- 
ing more than 50 people); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(l)(B), (C) (entitling an employee to 12 weeks 
leave for the birth or adoption of a child). 
33 1. Nancy E. Dowd, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Ten Years of Experience: 
Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U .  J.L. & POL'Y 219,222-31 (2004) [hereinafter 
Ten Years of Experience]. 
332. Id. at 231-36. 
333. Erin Gielow, Note, Equality in the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not Work, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1529,1539 (2002) 
334. Id. at 1546. 
335. In April 2006, Representative Caroline Maloney introduced HR 5148, the Federal Em- 
ployees Paid Parental Leave Act. The Act would ensure paid leave for 6 of the 12 weeks that federal 
employees are authorized to take parental leave. H.R. 5148, 109th Cong. (2006) (referred to H. 
Comm. on Gov't Reform), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?clO9:H.R.5 148:. 
336. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE $ 3300 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $ 124.136 (West 
2006) (providing that permanent government employees shall receive 70% of their salary for four of 
the six weeks in which they are authorized to take parental leave). 
337. Dowd, supra note 33 1 at 233-36 (summarizing European Union law, and comparing, inter 
alia, the approach of France, which mandates maternity leave and provides much more generous 
paid leaves to mothers than to fathers, and Sweden, whlch is gender-neutral in its paid parenting 
leave policies); see also Naomi S. Stem, The Challenges of Parental Leave Reforms for French and 
American Women: A Call for a Revived Feminist-Social Theory, 28 VT. L. REV. 321, 324-25 (2004) 
(describing the French statutory scheme). 
338. Gielow, supra note 333, at 1547. 
339. American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Breast Feeding and the Use of Hu- 
man Milk, 11 5 PEDIATRICS 496, 496-97 (2005); see also Shana M. Christrup, Breasrfeeding in the 
American Workplace, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 471, 474-76 (2001); Judy Heymann, 
Editorial, We Can Afford to Give Parents a Break, WASH. POST, May 14,2006, at B07. 
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easier to breastfeed when not working full-time.340 Both newborns and 
older children whose health needs are not met promptly are likely to be 
sicker for longer periods of time, adding to state and federal health care 
expenditures.341 In addition, parents who are distracted by ill children 
left at home may be less productive workers.342 Studies of parental leave 
practices in other countries show that parents who are given generous 
paid leaves to care for their children rarely abuse it,343 and that children, 
parents, and employers benefit when the law provides a framework for 
parents to care for their children's health without jeopardizing the famil- 
ial 
C. Environmental Exposures 
Children and fetuses are exposed to an astounding number of toxins, 
teratogens, mutagens, and carcinogens in the environment.345 While the 
fill  effects of these exposures are not yet known,346 and a comprehensive 
discussion of environmental hazards is beyond the scope of this paper, 
one recent example of government actions putting children at risk is in- 
structive. In March 2005 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
promulgated the so-called Clean Air Mercury ~ u l e , ~ ~ ~  which reversed a 
2000 EPA rule and substantially expanded the ability of American power 
plants to continue to emit mercury and other toxic air pollutants. The 
EPA announced that coal- and oil-burning power plants were not subject 
to the requirements of $1 12 of the Clean Air Act, which would have re- 
quired them to install new equipment to reduce mercury emissions. In- 
stead, the new rule created a complicated system of "cap-and-trade" pol- 
340. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 339 at 498; Christrup, supra note 339, at 
480-81. 
341. Cf: KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 12 (citing a study in 
Washington State showing that children who lack health care insurance were less likely than those 
who do to have had a clinic or physician visit within six months and are twice as likely to have 
received care at an emergency room during the same period). 
342. See Gielow, supra note 333, at 1541-43. 
343. DECKER, supra note 64, at 10 ("Contrary to the widely held belief that employees would 
abuse a liberal leave policy, the average usage rate of [Sweden's generous leave policy, which is 90 
days per year to care for a sick child] . . . is seven days a year."). 
344. See Gielow, supra note 333, at 1540-42. 
345. In recognition of the risks posed by these exposures, in 1997 President Clinton formed a 
Task Force on Environmental Health and Safety Risks to Children, to improve inter-agency coopera- 
tion within the federal government to provide greater protections for children's health. Exec. Order 
No. 13,045,62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (April 23, 1997). 
346. Robert L. Brent & Michael Weitzman, The Current State of Knowledge About the Eflects, 
Risks, and Science of Children's Environmental Exposures, 113 PEDIATRICS 1158, 1159, 1164-65 
(2004), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.orglcgdreprint~113/4/S1/1158 (noting the wide 
range of conclusions reached about the risk that pesticides and other environmental toxicants pose to 
children, urging that more, carefully controlled, studies be undertaken to evaluate issues such as the 
susceptibility of children compared with adults, the impact of exposure to multiple environmental 
hazards, and observing that where there is sufficient data to act, as in the case of lead, there is no 
reason to delay). 
347. Mark D. Sullivan & Christine A. Fazio, The EPA 's New Clean Air Rules: Mixed Results 
for Air Qualify, N.Y. ST. B.J. 1 1, 15 (Jan. 2006); 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29,2005) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
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lution allowances which permitted the power plants to increase their 
mercury pollution by purchasing emissions allowances from other facili- 
ties.348 Since half of all Americans live within thirty miles of a coal- 
burning power plant, children and their families living near a power plant 
were likely to be exposed to substantially more mercury emissions than 
they are now.349 Eleven states filed suit to invalidate the new ~ u l e . ~ "  
Congressional critics also sought to overturn the Rule, citing the 
significant risks that mercury poses to fetuses and children. They noted 
that mercury was a recognized neurotoxin, which causes devastating 
effects on fetuses and young children because it interferes with normal 
brain development. They further noted that 4.9 million women of child- 
bearing age have elevated levels of mercury, 630,000 infants are born 
with elevated mercury levels, and 1,500 children are born each year with 
mental retardation due to in utero exposure to mercury.351 Ultimately, 
this Congressional effort was defeated. Although EPA agreed to recon- 
sider the in May 2006 the agency reaffirmed its original posi- 
t i ~ n . ~ ' ~  
D. Lack of Health Care Access in the United States and Its 
Consequences 
1. Uninsured Children and Adults 
Americans continue to lack health insurance coverage in record 
numbers. In 2005, 5 1.4 million Americans (almost 18%) were uninsured 
for at least some part of the previous year, and 29.3 million (more than 
10%) had been uninsured for more than a year.354 Although children 
were more likely than adults to have health insurance, 9.2 million chil- 
348. Sullivan & Fazio, supra note 347, at 15-16; Kim McGuire, New Mercury Rules Decried, 
Environmental Coalition Plans Lawsuits over EPA Changes, Activists Say the New Limits Will Allow 
More Mercury Pollurionfi.om Coal-Bunting Power Plants- Which They Say Violates the Clean Air 
Act, DENVER POST, May 18,2005, at B-02. 
349. Mark Clayton, In Bid to Cut Mercury, US Lets Other Toxins Through, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2005, at 13, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/ 
0331/p13sOl-sten.html (noting also that coal-fired power plants also emit many other serious pollut- 
ants, including "vanadium, barium, zinc, nickel, hydrogen fluoride, hydrochloric acid, ammonia, and 
selenium"). 
350. Don Hopey, I I Srares Sue EPA on Mercury Rules: Pennsylvania Joins suit Saying Emis- 
sion Standard. Inadequate, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 19, 2005, crvailable at 
http:/lwww.post-gazette.comlpglO5 139150705 1 .stm. 
351. Senate Debate on Disapproval of EPA Rule Promulgation, 151 CONG. REc. S9912, 
S9913-14 (2005). 
352. Sullivan & Fazio, supra note 347, at 16. 
353. EPA, FINAL RULE RECONSIDERING TWO MERCURY ACTIONS: (1) RECONSIDERATION OF 
RULE REVISING EARLIER REGULATORY FINDING AND REMOVING CERTAIN ELECTRIC STEAM 
GENERATING UNITS FROM THE LIST OF SOURCE CATEGORIES; AND (2) RECONSIDERATION OF THE 
CLEAN AIR ~ ~ E R C U R Y  RULE FACT SHEET 1, 2 (May 31, 2006), 
http:/lwww.epa.govlair/mercuryrulelpdfslfs2006053 1 .pdf. 
354. ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 
ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2005 1 
(Mar. 2006), http:l/www.cdc.govlnchs/daWnhi~Iear1yrelease/in~~~2OO6O3.pdf. 
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dren (more than 12%) lacked health insurance for some portion of the 
year and an additional 3.9 million (more than 5%) had been without 
health care coverage for more than a year.355 There are also substantial 
racial and ethnic disparities in insurance status, with Hispanics suffering 
the greatest access problems, although African-Americans also lagged 
behind their white counterparts. One-third of all Hispanics were unin- 
sured for at least part of the previous year and one-quarter lacked health 
care coverage for more than a year.356 About 13% of pregnant women 
lack health insurance coverage,357 despite efforts to expand Medicaid 
during the last two decades.358 Medicaid does insure a greater proportion 
of pregnant than non-pregnant women,359 and pays for a third of all 
American births.360 
The consequences of lack of health insurance for adults and chil- 
dren are profound. While prenatal care is seen as an important factor in 
leading to good birth-outcomes,361 many poor and low-income American 
women continue to lack prenatal care,362 and those who receive some 
prenatal care often receive it late in pregnancy, when it is less effec- 
tive. 363 Similarly, while pediatricians and health policymakers agree that 
well-child visits are essential to providing necessary screening and other 
preventative care,364 half of uninsured children fail to have even one 
well-child visit a year.365 Children with private health insurance cover- 
age are much more likely to have received all necessary immunizations 
than those who are uninsured or have government health insurance.366 
355. Id. at 8. This percentage that has not changed since 2002. Id. at 2-3. 
356. Id. at 4. See also URBAN INSTITUTE, HEALTH INSURANCE TRENDS (2005), available at 
http:Nwww.urban.orgltooIlcitlissue~ealthinsance.cfm?rendeorin1. 
357. KENNETH E. THORPE, JENNIFER FLOME & PETER JOSKI, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE AMONG PREGNANT WOMEN, 1999 5-6 (2001), available at 
http://www.marchofdimes.com/files/2001FinalThorpeReport.pdf. Forty-seven percent of poor 
pregnant women lacked Medicaid coverage in 1999. Id. at 10. 
358. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 5; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAOffEMD-91-10: PRENATAL CARE: EARLY SUCCESS M ENROLLMG WOMEN MADE 
ELIGIBLE BY ~ D I C A I D  EXPANSIONS 7-8 (Feb. 1991), available at 
http://archive.gao.gov/d2 l t91143346.pdf (describing legislative changes). 
359. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32. 
360. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES, MATERNAL AND 
CHILD HEALTH UPDATE 2002: STATE HEALTH COVERAGE FOR LOW-INCOME PREGNANT WOMEN, 
CHILDREN, AND PARENTS 1 (June 10,2003), http://www.nga.org/Files/pd~C~DATE02.pdf. 
361. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. at 8-9 (analyzing results of Medicaid expansions of the 1980's and early 1990's). 
364. See, e.g., MEDICAID FACTS, supra note 29, at 1. The American Academy of Pediatrics 
recommends that children receive 10-1 1 well-child visits before the age of three, in order for pedia- 
tricians to monitor child behavior and development and prevent illness and behavioral and educa- 
tional problems in the future. Steven Blurnberg, Neal Halfon, & Lynn M. Olson, National Survey of 
Early Childhood Health, National Survey of Early Childhood Health: Parents ' Views on Preventive 
Care for Infants and Toddlers, 113 PEDIATRICS 1899 (2004), available at 
http:Npediatrics.aappublications.org/cg~113/6/S 111 899. 
365. URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356. 
366. National Survey of Early Childhood Health, National Survey of Early Childhood Health: 
Parents ' Views on Preventive Care for Infants and Toddlers, supra note 364, at 6. 
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2. Medicaid and SCHIP Need Improvement 
Medicaid is a partnership between state and federal governments, 
which provides health insurance to the very poorest of American children 
and adults, persons with disabilities, and elderly needing long-term 
care.367 All states participating in Medicaid agree to provide the same set 
of federally mandated services for children,368 which are known as Early 
and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment Services ( E P S D T ) . ~ ~ ~  
These provide essential care for children, particularly those with disabili- 
ties and other special needs.370 However, many children have not re- 
ceived the mandated EPDST benefits, either because they cannot find a 
physician willing to accept the low Medicaid reimbursement rates,371 or 
because some states have failed to adequately define the EPSDT services 
in their managed care contracts.372 Several suits have been brought by 
groups of parents challenging the denial of benefits,373 but it has been an 
uphill struggle to ensure that children enrolled in Medicaid receive all the 
- -- - -- - 
367. For a good overview of the Medicaid program, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO-01-749, MEDICAID: STRONGER EFFORTS NEEDED TO ENSURE CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO 
HEALTH SCREENING SERVICES 1-8 (July 2001) [hereinafter GAO, MEDICAID REPORT]. 
368. States differ in the extent to which they provide covered services to the near-poor, as well 
as the desperately poor. For example, all states provide coverage to parents who earn no more than 
the Federal Poverty Level, which is $16,600 for a family of three in the Lower Forty-Eight states. 
Only 14 states have raised their eligibility levels about the Federal Poverty Level. NATIONAL 
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, POOR PARENTS ON MEDICAID TARGETED FOR CUTS 1-2 & 3 n.8 (Feb. 
2006), available at http:Nwww.nwlc.orglpdfTFSPoorParentsTargeted-O6.06.pdf. 
369. Some state variation is permitted in what services are covered under the rubric of "family 
planning," which includes birth control, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, and sterilization, 
NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, MEDICAID, BIRTH CONTROL AND WOMEN'S HEALTH 1 & 2 n.2 
(Mar. 10,2006), available at http://www.nwlc.org/pdfTFSMedicaidBirthContrdWomens 
Health-05.3 1.06.pdf, thus risking reversal of recent gains in health outcomes for children and their 
parents, including the decrease in the rate of teenage pregnancy. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 
2005 I D S  COUNT POCKET GUIDE 7 (2005), available at 
http://www.aecf.org/ludscount~sld/db059dfb.pdf (noting that the teen birth rate has stead- 
ily declined since 1991, reaching its lowest level ever, 43 births per 1,000, in 2002). Medicaid 
provides two-thirds of all federal and state family planning funding. NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW 
CENTER, MEDICAID, BIRTH CONTROL AND WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra at 1. 
370. See MEDICAID FACTS, supra note 29, at 1. EPSDT services provide all necessary preven- 
tative, diagnostic, and screening care necessary to prevent and treat acute and chronic health condi- 
tions, including both physical and mental ailments. Medicaid's goal in insisting that they be pro- 
vided is not only to ameliorate individual patient suffering, but also to prevent the development of 
more serious health problems, which are both expensive and debilitating. Id. 
371. Id.at2. 
372. Id. Some contend that the increased enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries into managed 
care is the source of this failure, id., while others assert that managed care enhances access to health 
care services, because Medicaid beneficiaries now have a medical home, rather than being forced to 
hunt for a provider willing to accept the historically low Medicaid fees. See Vernon Smith & Linda 
Hamacher, The "Good Olde Days" of Fee-for-Service Were Not So Good Ajfer All: Managed Care 
Has Made Things Better 3, 6-8 (Ass'n of Health Ctr. Affiliated Health Plans, Working Paper, May 
2003), available at h t t p : / / w w w . a h c a h p . o r g / p u b l i c a t i o n s ~ W o r k i n g o /  
373. Suits have been brought in at least 28 states. See GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 
367, at 9; see, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 863 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
parents could seek injunctive relief against Michigan and managed care organizations with which 
Michigan had contracted to enforce the children's rights to receive EPSDT services); see also Frew 
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) (upholding a federal court consent decree in which Texas health 
officials agreed to provide EPSDT services to the more than one million child beneficiaries of the 
Texas Medicaid program, many of whom received services via managed care). 
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services to which they are entitled.374 Other bamers to health care access 
under Medicaid are discussed below. 
The State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was inaugu- 
rated in 1997, with the goal of giving states additional options in address- 
ing the health care needs of children. In contrast to Medicaid, whose 
recipients are entitled to receive all mandated EPSDT services, SCHIP 
permits states to offer a less generous package of benefits, with the goal 
of reaching a larger group of enrollees.375 SCHIP also authorizes states 
to provide services to the low-income parents of eligible children, and 
this opportunity for parental enrollment has increased the number of 
children who receive health care services.376 However, children's health 
advocates, notably Sara Rosenbaum, have strongly criticized the SCHIP 
program for promising more than it actually delivers in terms of services 
to children.377 
Unlike ~ e d i c a i d , ~ ~ '  the SCHIP program can be curtailed if states 
decide it is too generous or that they cannot afford it.379 In the late 
1990s, when the economy was strong, many states engaged in significant 
outreach activities, and Medicaid and SCHIP enrollments boomed, even 
though many eligible children and families were still not enrolled in the 
programs.380 But as the economy faltered in the early twenty-first cen- 
tury, many states began to face large budget deficits. They scrambled to 
limit enrollment in SCHIP, either by freezing enrollment numbers, in- 
creasing procedural obstacles to enrollment, imposing cost-sharing 
measures, or limiting outreach a~tivit ies.~'~ As a result, SCHIP enroll- 
ment has fallen dramatically in many states.382 
Further, as a result of the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2 0 0 5 , ~ ~ ~  federal and state spending on Medicaid will be significantly 
curtailed,384 and some Medicaid enrollees will have to spend much more 
374. GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 1-2,7-8. 
375. Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 18-2 1. 
376. KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 9-1 0. 
377. Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 18-21. 
378. Medicaid provides states with some flexibility in provision of services through its waiver 
procedures, but historically it has been difficult for states to make major cuts in services. However, 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-171, has made significant changes in Medicaid. See 
discussion infa in text accompanying notes 384-388. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID 1-3 (Feb. 2006), 
[hereinafter KAISER, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload 
7465.pdf. 
379. KAISER, ENROLLMG CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 2. 
380. KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 2.4 
381. KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 1-2. 
382. Id.; see also KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWG NEED, supra note 160, 1-4. 
383. Pub. L. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (signed by President Bush Feb. 8,2006). 
384. The Congressional Budget Office estimates $4.8 billion in reductions over the period 
2006 - 2010 and $26.1 billion over the next ten years. See KAISER, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, supra 
note 379, at 1. 
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out of pocket for their health care.38s Congress made major changes in 
Medicaid, permitting states to charge families with incomes greater than 
150% of the federal poverty level ($24,900 for a family of three in 2006) 
premiums and cost-sharing (co-pays, etc.) for health care services, al- 
though these cost-sharing requirements are not to be applied to pregnant 
women and certain eligible children.386 In addition, the law makes it 
harder for certain groups of children to receive the preventative EPSDT 
services previously mandated.387 
3. Insurance Alone is Not the Answer 
Two decades of research on Medicaid and SCHIP have shown that 
merely making government insurance available is insufficient to ensure 
adequate care, for a number of reasons.388 First, because Medicaid was 
originally conceived of as part of the welfare system, it lacks necessary 
political support,389 and many health care professionals choose not to 
participate because of the very low reimbursement rates.390 Medicaid 
recipients often feel stigmatized, and many eligible families are discour- 
aged from enrolling.391 As noted, in some states, the shift of poor chil- 
dren and families into Medicaid and SCHIP managed care programs has 
created access and service problems which parallel those of middle class 
families in managed care,392 with children failing to receive preventative 
screenings or other mandated services.393 In other states, however, 
Medicaid managed care delivers better health care services to its enrol- 
385. Although it appears that the primary impact of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) 
will be to curtail government spending on behalf of elderly and disabled adults, the DRA will also 
affect some children and their families. Id. at 1-6. 
386. Id. at 1-3. 
387. Id. at 3. 
388. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 5. 
389. John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicaid, 340 N. E .  J. MED. 403, 
407 (1999) (noting that "Medicaid underscores the ambivalence of a society that continually strug- 
gles with the question of which citizens deserve access to publicly financed medical care, and under 
what conditions"). 
390. GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 13-14. 
391. Alexandra Marks, Healthcare 'Crisis' Grows for Middle Claw, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2002, at USA 3; Lauren Terrazzano, More Kids Uninsured; L.I. Is One of the 
Nation's Richest Areas But Its Children Are Insurance-Poor in Greater Numbers, NEWSDAY, Aug. 
20,2005, at A08. 
392. Some access problems are inevitable in a system which provides disincentives to treat. 
See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 21 1 (2000) (describing the incentives inherent in both managed 
care and fee-for-service medicine). For a fuller discussion of the problems of managed care, see 
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN, & TROYEN A. BRENNAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND 
POLICY 1 180- 1298 (2d ed. 1998). Of course, one should be cautious in bashing managed care, since 
the fee-for-service health care system also has undesirable incentives, particularly to over-treat, 
which can be equally bad for patient well-being. Id. at 160-83. 
393. GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 9-10, 12-13. For example, only 19% of 
Medicaid enrolled children five and under had been screened for lead poisoning, even though this 
group of children is "almost five times more likely than others to have a harmful blood lead level." 
Id. at 12. Only a fifth of eligible children aged two to five had visited a dentist within the previous 
year. Id. 
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lees than the traditional fee-for-service In any case, since 
Medicaid and SCHIP enrollees are frequently less well-educated, lack 
child care and convenient transportation, and are not native English 
speakers, it may be difficult for them to receive all of the care to which 
they are entitled.395 
Further, either by design or inadvertence, Medicaid and SCHIP 
have substantial barriers to enrollment and utilization. These include 
complex eligibility rules (including in many states, denial of eligibility if 
the parents have even limited assets), cumbersome forms to fill out at 
inconvenient locations, and requirements of frequent reenrollment, as 
often as every six months.396 SCHIP permits enrollees to be charged 
premiums or ~ o - ~ a ~ m e n t s . ~ ~ '  This can be a significant burden for low- 
income families enrolled in SCHIP.~~' Although it is necessary to ensure 
that enrollees meet the statutory means tests, and to acknowledge the 
possibility of "crowd-out" (the phenomenon by which consumers shift 
from privately funded health insurance to public programs),399 if con- 
cerns about fraud or crowd-out become a major focus, many children 
will not have access to health care.400 
4. Inadequate Substance Abuse Programs 
The resources presently available to treat women who abuse alcohol 
and other drugs are woefully inadequate. There are three major problems 
with most substance abuse programs: 1) they fail to recognize the sig- 
nificant relationship between domestic violence and women's mental 
illness and substance abuse;401 2) they do not take into account the differ- 
ing treatment needs of men and women;402 and 3) they do not provide the 
complementary support necessary for pregnant women and mothers to 
succeed in beating their addiction.403 Only 14% of the drug treatment 
394. See, e.g., Patrick J. Roohan et a]., Quality Measurement in Medicaid Managed Care and 
Fee-for-Service, the New York State Experience, 21 AM. J .  MED. QUALITY 185 (2006); Smith & 
Hamacher, supra note 372. 
395. GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 14. 
396. KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 4-10 (summarizing recent 
changes made by states in Medicaid and SCHlP and their impact on enrollment). 
397. Id. at 7, 13. 
398. Id. at 6-8. 
399. Id. at 14-15. For a general discussion of the crowd-out phenomenon, see John V. Jacobi, 
Government Reinsurance Programs and Consumer-Driven Care, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 571-73 
(2005). 
400. See URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356. 
401. Only 35% of drug treatment facilities in the United States have programs for persons 
needing treatment for both substance abuse and mental illness. See SUBSTANCE MUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (N-SSATS): 2003, DATA ON 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITIES 4 (Sept. 2004), mailable a t  
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/03nssats/nssats~rpt~O3.pdf. 
402. See id. 
403. See id. 
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facilities in the United States have programs specifically designed to treat 
pregnant and postpartum women.404 
Many women who abuse alcohol and other drugs were sexually 
abused or beaten as children and have significant mental health and self- 
esteem issues, which make it much more likely that they will misuse 
Without acknowledgement of the causal connections between 
domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental illness and active inter- 
vention to prevent current domestic violence from continuing, women 
will not receive the support necessary to recover from addiction and 
mental illness.406 Those who work in the government agencies that deal 
with domestic violence victims, including police, hospital staff, and so- 
cial workers need more training in understanding the broad context of 
domestic violence, in order for their interventions to be appropriate and 
effective. 407 
Many drug treatment programs are not designed with the needs of 
women in mind. For example, traditional confrontational approaches, 
effective with male drug addicts, do not work well with women,408 and 
women also have better treatment outcomes in programs that are for 
women only.409 For women who are long-term abusers, residential pro- 
grams are most effe~tive,~" but these programs must take into account 
the needs of women with ~hildren.~" Child care, housing, health care, 
.job training, and other vital supports are necessary if women are to stay 
"clean" and become self-~ufficient.~'~ Further, the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act should be amended to provide an exemption from its strict 
time limits, to acknowledge that addiction recovery does not fit neatly 
into the statutory timetable.413 Finally, more programs must emphasize 
prevention, to treat addicted women before they become pregnant.414 
5. The Consequences of America's Inadequate Health Care System 
Research over the last several decades has made clear the conse- 
quences of inadequate health care for America's women and children. 
Both maternal and infant mortality are higher in the United States than in 
404. Id. 
405. Paltrow, supra note 12, at 477; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 1. 
406. WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 3. 
407. Id. 
408. SANDRA L. BLOOM, THE PVS DISASTER: POVERTY, VIOLENCE, AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 165 (2002). 
409. Id. at 164; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 5,23. 
410. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 108 (citing M. Daley et al., The Impact of Subsrance Abuse 
Treatment Modality on Birth Weight and Healrh Care Expenditures, 33 J .  PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 
57-66 (2001)). 
41 1. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 164. 
412. Id. (citing NAT'L INST. OF DRUG ADDICTION, TREATMENT METHODS FOR WOMEN 13652 
(1999)). 
413. See generally Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies, supra note 9. 
414. See generally WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12. 
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many other  nation^.^" American children are more likely to be born pre- 
term and at low or very low birthweightY4l6 and are less likely to have 
preventative doctors' visits, obtain necessary immunizations, and access 
necessary reproductive and mental health care.417 Study after study has 
shown that a focus on pregnant women as a vehicle for ensuring healthy 
children is too little, too late. Instead, comprehensive solutions, which 
address the systemic failure to take care of America's children, must be 
developed. 
If we are to truly assist children to become healthy adults who are 
able to embrace life's opportunities, we must explore new ways of think- 
ing about the health of children and the women who bear and raise them. 
There are six areas where change is crucial: ending poverty, providing 
universal health care, expanding substance abuse prevention and treat- 
ment programs, enhancing environmental and workplace protections, 
instituting no-fault compensation for children who are harmed in utero, 
and ending criminal and civil actions against pregnant women who may 
be placing their fetuses at risk. 
End Poverty 
Even making this recommendation seems both na'ive and incredibly 
ambitious; yet it is an inescapable fact that being poor has serious ad- 
verse consequences for children's health and development. Children 
living in poverty (who are also more likely to be malnourished and 
homeless) have more learning disabilities and mental retardation, lower 
IQs, and higher rates of mental illness, behavioral problems, and greater 
physical health problems, than middle-income children.418 The effects of 
childhood poverty continue through adulthood, perpetuating the cyclical 
connection between inadequate parental income and childhood disease 
and dysfunction.419 With twelve million American children living in 
families with incomes less than the federal poverty level (and five mil- 
415. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59. 
416. IOM Report, supra note 55. 
417. KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 1; GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra 
note 367, at 9, 12-13. 
418. Charles Oberg, Maternal & Child Health Program, School of Public Health, University of 
Minnesota, The Impact of Childhood Poveriy on Health and Development, HEALTHY GENERATIONS, 
May 2003, at 2 & 3 m.7-10; See also Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Trajectories of 
Poverw and Children S Mental Health, 37 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 207,207 (1996). 
419. Case, Darren Lubotsky & Christina Paxson, Economic Status and Health in Child- 
hood: The Origins of the Gradient, 92 AM. EcON. REVIEW 1308, 1308-09 (2002). Studies indicate 
that malnutrition in utero has significant life-time consequences, which actually are more pro- 
nounced as people age. See Gina Kolata, So Big and Healthy Nowadqys, Gran+a Wouldn't Know 
You, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,2006, at A l .  
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lion of those children living on less than half that amount),420 interven- 
tion is critical. 
Provide Universal Health Care 
Universal health care coverage is essential if we are to provide chil- 
dren with the health care services necessary for them to grow, learn, and 
develop into healthy and productive adults, who in turn will have healthy 
children of their own. While there are many historical and philosophical 
reasons for America's reliance on the market to provide health care for 
its citizens,421 we can no longer afford to ignore the health care needs of 
the one-sixth of the population who lack health insurance of any kind.422 
Estimates of the cost of providing health care coverage for all Americans 
range from thirty-three to sixty-nine billion dollars annually,423 poten- 
tially less than the amount the American government currently spends on 
the war in ~ r a ~ . ~ ~ ~  While several states have recently enacted laws ex- 
panding health care coverage4*' a comprehensive solution requires a fed- 
eral effort. 
At the very least, a uniform federal health care program for children 
with a comprehensive set of benefits and services should be estab- 
l i ~ h e d . ~ ~ ~  This would avoid the cyclical contractions and expansions of 
state Medicaid and SCHIP programs which presently accompany eco- 
nomic upswings and downturns and make it difficult for states to pay for 
420. NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDHOOD POVERTY, MAILMAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, WHO ARE AMERICA'S POOR CHILDREN 1, available at 
http://www.nccp.org/pub-cpt05b.html. 
421. See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do? National Health Reform 
Abroad, 32 J. L. MED. &ETHICS 433 (2004). 
422. URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356 (finding that 46.6 million Americans did not have 
insurance in 2005). As a practical matter, the uninsured do receive some health care through emer- 
gency room visits. Such care is expensive and often time-consuming. It is estimated that one-third 
of the care provided at hospital emergency departments is inappropriate. Ceci Connolly, Some 
Finding No Room at the ER; Screening Out Non-Urgent Cases Stirs Controversy, WASH. POST, Apr. 
26, 2004, at A01. The high costs of providing emergency room care required under EMTALA, the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, and state anti-dumping laws are borne by 
hospitals and ultimately, the tax-payer. See Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (N.Y 2001) 
(discussing the problem of immigrants who are denied care until their medical situation becomes an 
emergency). 
423. URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356. These estimates appear to be in 2004 dollars. If it is 
not possible to establish health care for the entire population immediately, then, at a minimum, full 
coverage for children's health care should be established now, before the mass of Baby Boomers age 
into retirement, Medicare, and the need for long-term care. 
424. In February, 2006, the Department of Defense stated that it was spending $4.5 billion a 
month (or $54 billion a year) on the Iraq war. Mark Mazetti & Joel Haveman, Iraq War is Costing 
$100,00Oper Minute, SEA~TLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006; Mark Silva, $70 Billion Sought for War Costs; 
White House Says Another $50 Billion Needed for 2007, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3,2006, at Cl .  
425. The most notable are the Massachusetts Health Care Access and Affordability Act, ch.. 58 
(2006), available at http://www.mass.govflegidlaws/seslaw06/slO60058.htm, and the Maryland Fair 
Share Health Care Fund Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 5 8.5-101 et. seq, partially invalidated 
by Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 48 1 (D. Md. 2006) (finding the act pre- 
empted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). 
426. The Medicaid EPSDT program should be seen as a floor, not a ceiling. See Rosenbaum, 
Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 43; see also supra text accompanying notes 370-401. 
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adequate health care in times of fiscal exigency.427 With national univer- 
sal coverage, children will not lose access to vital health services because 
their parents move or change jobs, fail to fill out cumbersome paper- 
work, earn slightly more or less income, or are unable to afford premi- 
urns and ~ o - ~ a ~ m e n t s . ~ ~ ~  Further, boys and girls who receive good 
health care will become adults who are more likely to bear healthy chil- 
dren. 
Ultimately, however, if we want to meet the goal of having more 
American children in good health, it will be necessary to provide health 
care for all adults as well. Issues of nutition, infertility, sterility, sexu- 
ally transmitted diseases, and reproductive problems must be addressed 
in the adult population if we are to achieve better birth outcomes. 
Provide Expanded and Targeted Substance Abuse Programs for Preg- 
nant Women and Addicts Who Are Likely to Become Pregnant 
As noted above, substance abuse education and treatment programs 
must be expanded and improved in order to serve both addicted women 
and the children they bear. Treatment which takes into account the spe- 
cial needs of women with drug and alcohol problems has been shown to 
be effective and to save money over the long run.429 
Improve Environmental, Workplace, and Public Health Protections 
At the same time, medical treatment alone is insufficient to ensure 
children's health. Environmental, workplace, and other public health 
laws must be strengthened to protect children from exposure to toxic 
substances, whether exposure is in utero or after birth. In addition, the 
government should mandate paid parental leave so that parents will be 
able to care for their children when they are infants or ill. 
Establish a No-Fault Program to Compensate Children Who Suffer Pre- 
natal Harm 
One way that the government can respect the autonomy of pregnant 
women, compensate children who are harmed due to prenatal injury or 
exposure to toxic substances, and respond to the fears of employers and 
others about tort liability is to establish a national prenatal injury com- 
pensation program. Such a program could be funded by modest contri- 
butions by employers and manufacturers of toxic substances, including 
alcohol. Such a program could be modeled on the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury (NCVI) program,430 enacted in 1986 to encourage vac- 
427. Smith & Hamacher, supra note 372, at 12-13. 
428. See generally KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160. 
429. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 163-75. 
430. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. $5 300aa-1-33, created a 
program to provide compensation children injured by state-mandated vaccines, as a means of ensur- 
ing that children who suffer injury from vaccination will be compensated, that parents will be en- 
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cine manufacturers to continue producing vaccines for childhood dis- 
eases while simultaneously compensating the small number of children 
who were injured as a result of vaccination, and thus reassure parents 
who might otherwise decide not to vaccinate their children. The NCVI 
has proved extraordinarily successful in meeting all three of its goals, 
and has been touted as a model for other tort-based consumer protection 
problems. 43' 
The program I propose acknowledges that women, men, and chil- 
dren face risks from the food and drink they consume, the environment, 
and the workplace, and that manufacturers of dangerous substances 
should be held responsible for the harm caused by in utero exposure, 
even when they try to minimize those risks. Children who suffer harm 
from an otherwise socially desired or valued product must be compen- 
sated, just as they are under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Pro- 
gram. The proposed program would involve a compromise, limiting 
liability of manufacturers and employers in exchange for guaranteeing 
compensation to prenatally injured children. These trade-offs are supe- 
rior to the current approach of excluding women from the workplace or 
otherwise penalizing women for their conduct during pregnancy. Manu- 
facturers would have an incentive to minimize the exposure to the toxic 
substances they use and produce, whether it is lead used to make batter- 
ies, mercury and other environmental contaminants, nicotine and tar in 
cigarettes, or alcohol in wine, beer, and Even sellers and dis- 
tributors of illegal drugs could be made to contribute to the PIC fund, by 
requiring monetary victim restitution as part of their criminal sen- 
t e n c e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
courage to vaccinate their children, and that manufacturers will not be discouraged from entering 
and participating in the vaccine market because of fears of liability for products that are "unavoid- 
ably unsafe." Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Catherine B. Bowman, No-Fault Compensation for Un- 
moidnble Injuries: Evaluating the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 16 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 277,279 (1991). 
43 1. Deny Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance, Lessons from the National Vaccine Injuv 
Compensation Program, 24 J .  HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 59, 76-88 (1999); Geoffrey Evans, Up- 
date on Vaccine Liabiliy in the United States: Presentation at the National Vaccine Program Ofice 
Workshop on Strengthening the Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines in the United States, 12 
Februaty 2002,42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 130-S137 (Mar. 1,2006), abstract available at 
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu~cgi-bin/ 10.1086/499592&erFrom=78718 17745 
696282041Guest. Under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, manufacturers pay a 
tax of $0.75 per dose of vaccine administered. Ridgway, supra at 62, http://content.nejm.org/ 
cgi/reprint/340/5/403 .pdf. 
432. Thus, for example, alcohol manufacturers and distributors would have an economic incen- 
tive to make warning labels about the effects of alcohol during pregnancy clearer, more conspicuous, 
and more explicit. Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Alcohol Warning Labels 
GO Unnoticed, Poll Finds (Aug. 20, 200), available at http://www.cspinet.org/booze/batf- 
labels2001gress.htm. 
433. Cf: U.S. SENTENCING UIDELINES ~ ~ A N U A L  55 5El.1, 8Bl.l (2005), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/5el~l.htm and http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/8bl~l.htm (requiring 
individual and organizational defendants to pay restitution to their victims). 
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End Civil Commitment and Involuntary Medical Treatment of Pregnant 
Women 
The involuntary restraint and compulsory medical treatment of 
pregnant women is counterproductive, deterring women from seeking 
medical and psychological help. Physicians and hospitals are fallible. 
They do a profound disservice to those whom they wish to help when 
they rely on court orders rather than trying to advise and persuade preg- 
nant patients about what is in their (and their fetuses') best interest. 
There is substantial evidence that health care providers are relying on 
racial and class stereotypes when they decide when to seek judicial inter- 
~ e n t i o n . ~ ~ ~  Similarly, there is no reason for legislatures to disable 
women from exercising the right to self-determination when pregnant, by 
rendering their advance medical directives invalid. 
End Civil and Criminal Liability of Pregnant Women for Causing 
Prenatal H a m  
The thesis of this article is that holding women civilly or criminally 
liable for their actions while pregnant is bad public policy. Imposing 
criminal or civil liability deters women from seeking medical care, in- 
cluding treatment for drug and alcohol addiction, leading to worse, rather 
than better, birth outcomes, and raises significant normative questions 
about who is the reasonable pregnant woman.435 Some American 
as well as those in other countries,437 have acknowledged that 
there is no way to prescribe the standard of appropriate behavior while 
pregnant with any certainty, that making a judgment about recklessness 
or negligence is inevitably subjective, and thus is fieighted with the pos- 
sibility of prejudice and bias. Further, most efforts at criminal prosecu- 
tion or civil commitment have focused on poor women and women of 
despite evidence that drug usage during pregnancy is equivalent 
across racial and economic lines, with the only difference being that 
white and middle-class women tend to use alcohol, a legal drug, rather 
than cocaine.439 
Attacking pregnant women provides a simplistic solution to a com- 
plex problem. Courts and legislatures should avoid this meretricious 
solution, recognizing the unique relationship between pregnant woman 
434. See generally Chasnoff, supra note 10; Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, supra 
note 9. 
435. Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474,477-78 (Tex. App. 1999). 
436. Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477-78; Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ill. 
1988); Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306,3 10-15 (Md. 2006). 
437. Dobson v. Dobson, 2 S.C.R. 753 (Can. 1999); Winnipeg Child & Family Services 
(Northwest Area) v. G .  (D.F.), 3 S.C.R. 925 (Can. 1997); Paton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
8416/78,3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408,415 (1980). 
438. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 109; Chasnoff, supra note 10; Roberts, Unshackling Black 
Motherhood, supra note 9. 
439. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 109-10. 
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and the fetus.440 Government policymakers should acknowledge that the 
vast majority of pregnant women want only the best for the fetus whom 
they are nourishing, and that in almost all cases women who are not act- 
ing in the best interests of their fetus are facing heavy burdens of pov- 
erty, addiction, lack of access to quality health care, and domestic abuse. 
The way to help such women, and the children they will bear, is to 
change the system in which they are now struggling, not to make preg- 
nant women the scapegoat for that system's failures. 
440. Stallman, 53 1 N.E.2d at 360. 
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